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THE IMPACT OF GENDER ON THE FIRST PHASE OF HIRING 
PROCESS: FIELD EXPERIMENTS IN PORTUGAL 
By Ana Margarida Duarte 
Absíract: This paper facuses on the first phase of lhe hiring process and tries to 
undersíand whether there is discrimination in gender and which main determinants are 
hehind this process. The hiring process is presently the least studied aspect in the labor 
relationship. This lack of awareness is due to the difficulty in gathering data on the 
processes that occur at the initial stage oj hiring. We conducled a correspondence test, 
sending more than two thousand applications to randomly assigned men and women 
wilh Portuguese Mas ter 's degrees and/or foreign Master 's degrees. The current sludy 
revealed clear differences helween female and male applicants. Our findings provided 
significant evidence that, when two idêntica! applicants are interested in the same job 
advertisement, lhe male and female applicant would receive similar replies, buí the 
female would have higher probabiliíies of callbacks for an interview. This means that 
women are not at a disadvantage in getting oífers. We find that women applicants are 
more likely to receive callbacks, wilh higher estimated probahilities in female 
dominaíed occupations when applying for managemení leveis. Inversely, small 
companies discriminate more against women. Our results indicate that employers give 
preference to female candidates who have invested in their human capital. During this 
crisis period, unemploymenl is one oj the worst features affecting the workforce. Our 
results indicate that employers are not "forgetting women" and women are not 
discriminated during the first phase of the hiring process. It is clear that gender 
discrimination is a reality in the labor market when viewed in long term career, but not 
during the admission phase. 
Keywords: correspondence test, discrimination, hiring, field experiment, gender 
JEL Classifications: C93, J16, J71, J78 
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Resumo: Este trabalho aborda a primeira fase do processo de selecção e 
recrutamento e tenta perceber se há discriminação por género, e quais são os 
principais determinantes por trás deste processo. O processo de selecção e 
recrutamento é presentemente o aspecto menos estudado da relação de 
trabalho. Este desconhecimento deve-se à dificuldade de recolha de dados sobre os 
processos que ocorrem na fase de selecção e recrutamento. Realizou-se um teste 
de correspondência, com mais de duas mil respostas a anúncios, feitos por mulheres e 
homens com mestrado concluído em Portugal e com mestrado realizado fora de 
Portugal. Os resultados revelam diferenças entre as mulheres e os homens candidatos. 
Dos quatro candidatos envolvidos num anúncio de emprego, os candidatos do sexo 
masculino e feminino recebem respostas semelhantes, mas as 
mulheres apresentam maiores probabilidades de serem chamadas para 
entrevista. Estes resultados mostram que as mulheres não estão em desvantagem no 
processo de recrutamento. As mulheres são mais propensas a receber convites para 
entrevistas, com maior probabilidade nas ocupações onde as mulheres estão em 
maioria, e para níveis executivos. Inversamente, as mulheres são mais discriminadas 
pelas pequenas empresas. Os resultados indicam que os empregadores dão 
preferência a candidatos do sexo feminino que tenham investido em capital 
humano. Neste período de crise, o desemprego é um dos piores atributos que atingem 
a força de trabalho. Os resultados indicam que os empregadores não estão a esquecer- 
se das mulheres, e que estas não estão a sofrer discriminação na primeira fase do 
processo de selecção e recrutamento. Fica claro que a discriminação entre géneros é 
uma realidade no mercado de trabalho, ao longo da carreira, mas não na fase de 
entrada. 
Palavras Chave: teste por eorrespondència, discriminação, selecção e 
recrutamento, experiência de campo, género. 
Classificação JEL: C93, .116, J71, .178 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There are many sources of the gender gap in the labor market caused by potential 
discrimination by employers: conceming the salary eamed for the same job, the hiring 
process, the occupation itself, receiving a promotion and how payment for different 
types of work is set. With an extensive labor market. getting access to good jobs in good 
companies may have a considerable impact on subsequent career developments and 
employment outcomes (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Petersen and Togstad, 2006). As 
Lazear (1991) stated, hiring is the most important issue, promotion comes second and 
wages come third. Despite its importance, the hiring process is poorly understood and 
hardly studied. It is particularly difficult to gather relevant data. In terms of who gets 
offers, discrimination is also difficult to document. There is limited research using field 
data on who gets job offers and who does not (Petersen and Togstad, 2006). During the 
selection and recruitment stage, companies choose one of the following three 
hypotheses: i) they hire the future employee directly, therefore these candidates are 
sought after; ii) employers place advertisements in specialized or general media and; iii) 
they outsource the process to selection and recruitment companies. In the first solution, 
the favored candidate option is targeted and specific and one cannot infer any 
discrimination criteria on gender. In the two other solutions, by observing the selection 
of several candidates, it is possible to analyze the existence of discrimination. 
The hiring process includes three different phases (Bloch, 1994): i) communication 
with the employer (advertisements in newspapers, specialized agencies or social 
networks); ii) selection of candidates (interviews, tests), and iii) presentation of salary 
conditions. Our research focuses on the first ol these phases. 
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This study uses a different method to assess differential treatment against women 
by using an experimental technique to collect representative data on the labor market. 
The candidates, whose job applications were equivalent in their human capital but 
differed only in their gender, were sent out in response to job advertisements. Our 
experiment generates an analysis of gender discrimination in one particular sub-section 
of the labor market (in financial, accounting, insurance activities as well as 
administrative and support services). Specifically, we sent out over two thousand 
applications to companies that offer job opportunities. If only the gender is changed, 
such an approach provides an unbiased estimate of the degree of labor market 
discrimination during the hiring process. This methodology has been carried out in 
previous studies (Neumark, et ai, 1996; Riach and Rich, 1987, 2006; Weichselbaumer, 
D., 2004). Our contribution here is to analyze gender differences in callbacks for a large 
sample that allows us to compare across job types. 
In what concems the hiring process, we come to a gloomy conclusion. Most of lhe 
statements of good intentions and practices do not fly from paper to real life. If we think 
about the growth of subcontract recruiter companies, we easily understand that 
companies prefer to hire people with low company culture rather than their own 
employees. Resides creating high leveis of uncertainty in the employee's approach and 
in his/her potential lack of commitment, this company^ approach questions the so 
called social responsibility that most companies publicly declare. It seems that the labor 
market is reinforcing the role of the secondary market as it was early defmed by 
Doeringer and Piore (1971) and Duarte et al. (2010). 
This research focuses on the hiring process and tries to understand whether there is 
discrimination in gender and which are lhe main determinants in this process. As Pager 
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(2007) states, discrimination is likely to be most pronounced in the early stages of the 
cmployment relationship (hiring), when information about the applicant is minimal and 
when the odds of being detected are low. The method applied in this study is 
correspondence testing. Most researchers (Pager, 2007; Riach and Rich, 2002, 2006) 
agree that field experiments are the only way to make evidence available for hiring 
discrimination; but Portuguese social researchers have not performed field experiments 
that test for discrimination until recently. This study, to the best of our knowledge, is the 
first contribution to the study of gender discrimination in the Portuguese labor market 
using experimental data. Despite the introduction of antidiscrimination legislation, 
current results indicate an unbiased effect of women in the hiring odds. Our findings 
show that for female-dominated occupations there is a positive and significant bias in 
favor of women, similar to the findings of Riach and Rich (2006). Also, our findings 
suggest that the glass ceiling effect does not exist in the hiring and recruitment process, 
where women have a higher estimated probability than men of getting callbacks to 
manager positions. These results are in line with those of Petersen, and Togstad, (2006). 
This thesis is organized as followed: Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
existing literature and hypothesis settings on gender discrimination during the hiring 
process. Section 3 describes the methodology and Section 4 presents the results. Section 
5 discusses and analyses the results and the last section concludes the thesis. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESES 
An analysis of Portuguese women's conditions in the labor market of 2010 and 
2011 (in the lst quarter) shows that women make up the majority ofits population (51.6 
per cent), although they only represent about 47 per cent of employed people 
(Ministério do Trabalho e da Solidariedade Social, 2010b). As in most European 
countries, the Portuguese labor market shows that women represent higher population, 
have higher human capital but for equal work earn less, failing to break the glass- 
ceiling. Previous research (Bagues and Esteve-Volart, 2010; Holzer, 1998; Petit, 2007) 
suggests that various changes on the demand side of the labor market, such as growing 
skill needs by employers and their shifting to other geographic locations, have greatly 
contributed to women^ improvement. However, most research finds a consistent and 
permanent segregation against women (Babcock and Laschever 2003; Blau and K.ahn, 
2006; Melkas and Anker, 1997; Petit, 2007). 
Assuming that men still enjoy an internai labor market advantage, there are two 
possible reasons that can parlly explain the gender inequity: (i) men genuinely have a 
stronger commitment to the labor market, or employment segregation in gender is 
related to the labor market division in distinct sectors/segments and the existence of 
minority groups of workers into sectors/segments with the worst job conditions; (ii) the 
labor market is divided into distinct sectors/segments, some desirable and others less so; 
males and females are funneled into those sectors/segments according to their gender. If 
one accepts that, then the male-female inequality stems from men being in "primary" 
sectors/segments of the market and women in "secondary" ones (Duarte et ai, 2010). 
However, dual/segmented labor market theories (Doeringer and Piore, 1971) have not 
fully identified the causes of employment segregation in gender. 
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2.1. Hiringand gender 
A real, concrete limitation for women to reach high-level positions is the unequal 
responsibility they still have for their children as well as the carrying out of household 
chores. Additionally, even young women still without family are potential mothers, with 
the correspondent negative perception on the hiring process. A large body of literature 
shows that the candidate gender might matter (Ayres and Siegelman, 1995; Black. 1995; 
Blank; 1991; Goldin and Rouse, 2000). A core explanation for labor market 
discrimination is based on economic agents having a taste for preference associated with 
certain people instead of others (Arrow, 1973; Becker, 1957; Donohue, 2007). This 
disfavor for women may indicate lower occupational access for them rather than for 
men, and suggests that women can potentially face occupational access discrimination. 
If employers, co-workers and/or consumers have tendencies towards discrimination and 
can distinguish women employees from men, the result may be discriminatory 
treatments. When employing women workers, biased employers feel that they must only 
pay the market salary, but they also have to pay a so-called "discriminatory psychic 
penalty" (Altonji and Blank, 1999; Becker, 1957; Bloch, 1994; Donohue, 2007). This 
penalty lowers the quantity demanded of the disfavored worker. And the greater the 
number of prejudiced employers or the stronger their preference intensity, the greater 
the employment gaps between the two groups of workers. Virtually, ali other 
explanations for labor market discrimination are not based on preference. Instead, 
statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1973; Donohue, 2007; Melkas and Anker, 1997; 
Phelps, 1972), centered in asymmetric information about a worker's ability is the key 
basis for the existence of discrimination. In other words, employers simply guess that 
such individual characteristics are correlated with the unobserved performance 
7 
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determinants. In examining discrimination cases during the recruitment process and 
candidate selection in the Austrian labor market, Weichselbaum (2004) found that 
women are treated unequally. However, Fernandez and Weinberg (1997), using data in 
entry-level positions in a large bank, ttnd a small positive effect of being female in 
getting a job offer. Neumark, et ai (1996) and Riach and Rich (2006) find that women 
are more likely to be discriminated against in higher statuses and higher sénior 
positions. Neumark, et al. (1996), in an audit study addressing gender discrimination in 
restaurant hiring, show that men have much better success in getting job offers in high- 
priced restaurants where the salary is high and women succeed in getting offers in low- 
priced restaurants, with corresponding low salaries. Some discrimination against women 
is expected to be found. The following hypotheses follow this line of argument: 
Hypothesis la. In the hiring process, the estimated prohability of replies and 
callbacks to women with Portuguese Mas ter's degrees (PMDs) is lower than 
the estimated prohability of replies and callbacks to men with PMDs. 
Hypothesis Ih. In the hiring process, lhe estimated prohability of replies and 
callbacks to women with for eign Mas ter's degrees (FMDs) is lower than the 
estimated prohability of replies and callbacks to men with FMDs. 
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2.2. Hiring, gender and human capital 
In lhe last 15-20 years, women were able to raise both real eamings and 
employment leveis in relative terms compared to men. In a recent study, eovering 35 
eountries, Wirth (2004) finds that women made up between 40 and 60 per cent of ali 
tertiary education in 26 eountries. In universities, women are already in majority (Blau 
and Kahn, 2007) and showing an inerease in their qualifications. However, their high 
levei of education does not correspond to the positions they occupy in the labor market. 
Women tend to choose study areas that do not provide them with the skills which allow 
them to follow more aspiring careers and progress into higher qualified, managerial 
positions. Women have a tendency to adapt the subjects they study and their occupation 
choice accordingly to jobs which are more "appropriate" for women, hence maintaining 
occupational sex segregation. 
As women have exceeded the educational leveis of men, they have also 
progressively gained access to jobs which are normally men stereotyped. These choices 
are growing and we progressively find women in non-traditional "female" occupations. 
They have increasingly achieved skilled jobs in areas of management, business, and 
finance (Betrand and Hallock, 2001). The fair representation of women in these specific 
aetivities suggests that there is no gender segregation in these sectors. In the Portuguese 
labor market, women represent 46% of Financial and insurance aetivities and in 
administrative and support services the ratio is 57% (Ministério do Trabalho e da 
Solidariedade Social, 2010a). 
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Considering that finance and insurance activities are more demanding and skilled 
than the administrative and support services, it seems that employers do not recognize 
women^ investment in education, selecting them for poorer and lower skilled 
occupations. 
Table 1: Distribution of people employed on 31 Dec 2008 by gender 
Total Men 
Men 
(%) 
Women 
Women 
(%) 
Financial, accounting and 
insurance activities 
69,435 37,773 54% 31,66 46% 
Administrative and 
support services 
99,722 42,711 43% 57,01 57% 
Source: Ministério do Trabalho e da Solidariedade Social (201 Oa) 
If an employer judges the workers based on their prior beliefs and the worker is 
aware of this, there are no (or limited) rewards for this investment. Hence, based on the 
arguments presented above: 
Hypothesis 2a. In the hiring process, the eslimated probability of replies and 
callhacks to women wiíh PMDs is similar to the esíimated probability of 
replies and callbacks to women wiíh FMDs. 
Hypothesis 2h. In the hiring process, the esíimated probability of replies and 
callbacks to men wiíh PMDs is lower than the esíimated probability of replies 
and callbacks to men wiíh FMDs. 
Hypothesis 2c. In the hiring process, lhe esíimated probability of replies and 
callhacks to women wiíh FMDs is lower than lhe esíimated probability of 
replies and callhacks to men wiíh PMDs. 
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2.3. Hiring, gender and dispersion 
We want to know, for a specific industry/occupation, if there is significant 
discrimination against women, and in which way. Since certain jobs are typically 
female or male, the labor market is segregated on gender (Brannan, M. and Priola, V., 
2009), therefore, when assessing job applicants, employers may differ in gender given 
the nature of the profession. If certain jobs are perceived as more appropriate for men 
(such as a truck driver or construction worker), female applicants may be (implicitly or 
explicitly) evaluated less favorably (Anker, 1997) because they do not fit society^ 
beliefs about what is appropriate for women. A series of company surveys (Paukert, 
1995) analyzed the intluence of sex stereotyping in occupational segregation by sex. In 
general, until the end of the 1990s, ali the studies tended to find discrimination against 
women in male-dominatcd and mixcd occupations and reverse discrimination (against 
men) in female-dominated occupations (Riach and Rich, 2002). Many employers 
indicated that a person's sex is an important consideration which affects hiring. From 
name-based experiments in Israel, Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) found that observed 
discrimination is against males, and primarily practiced by males. In another study of 
salary differences between males and females in the UK, Chevalier (2007) found that 
unlike their male counterparts, women are more likely to be altruistic and less career- 
oriented and invest in different types of human capital. If women were excessively 
represented in lower status groups and at the lower leveis of the corporate ladder, as 
Ibarra (1993) documented, women's homophilic attitude would be negatively correlated 
to the positional (vertical and horizontal) power of their network contacts. In addition, 
Weichselbaumer (2004) finds significant discrimination in sex lyped occupations, and 
Riach and Rich (2002), íind that discrimination against men in female occupations tends 
K. 
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to be much higher than against women in male occupations. In two different kinds of 
research, Riach and Rich (2002, 2006) find that in male-dominated occupations, women 
encountered discrimination twice as much as the male rate. On the other hand, sex- 
based occupational segregation also affects women positively as it shields some 
Females' occupations írom male competition (Kandolin, 1993), and maintains the 
demand for female labor (Letho, 1991). We infer that in female-dominated occupations, 
we will find a pro-female bias. The following hypothesis follows this line of argument: 
Hypothesis Sa. In lhe hiring process, in female dominated occupations lhe estimated 
prohahility of replies and callhacks to women with PMDs is higher than the 
estimated prohahility of replies and callhacks to men with PMDs. 
Hypothesis 3h. In the hiring process, in female dominated occupations the estimated 
prohahility of replies and callhacks to women with FMDs is higher than the 
estimated prohahility of replies and callhacks to men with FMDs. 
Hypothesis Sc. In the hiring process. in female dominated occupations the estimated 
prohahility of replies and callhacks to women with PMDs is lower than the 
estimated prohahility of replies and callhacks to women with FMDs. 
2,4. Hiring and the glass-ceiling 
Although much referred to by government officials, gender disparities remain 
important, particularly concerning working arrangements (especially the use of part- 
time, fixed term contracts or poorly paid, lower quality jobs). When it comes to the 
levei of labor market-entry, there is a larger consensus amongst researchers 
(Arulampalam et ai, 2005; Duarte et ai, 2010) that inequality is usually less 
significant. Younger women, especially business school graduates, appear to seítle their 
conditions as effectively as their male colleagues do. In addition, Jacobs (1992) and 
12 
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Cohen et ai (1998) found lhat there was little or no difference in the initial male and 
female Job conditions, but there was a significant gap after several years of tenure. 
Wirth (2004) discusses women^ substantial gains in management but also what remains 
of the "glass-ceiling" that hinders their rise to the very top hierarchies. The results of 
Krymkowski and Mintz (2008) suggest the presence of a ceiling effect; it is easier for 
women to break into male-dominated occupations initially than to keep moving up in 
their careers. She points out that women have benefíted from new educational and 
training opportunities in large numbers, and that has had a significant bearing on their 
rise in the hierarchy. Some authors perceive the difference in hiring possibilities as 
evidence in gender discrimination and failure in labor markets, both of which must be 
corrected through public policy intervention (Babcock and Laschever, 2003). 
Legislation encouraging gender quotas in top positions has been adopted in some 
countries and is being considered in many others. This decision of gender parity in 
managerial positions lies in the extremely low percentage of women in managerial 
positions within companies. Because in Portugal there is no such regulation, we do 
expect the hiring process will continue contributing to the presence of the glass-ceiling. 
Thus: 
Hypothesis 4a. In the hiring process, lhe esíimated probahility of replies and 
callhacks to women with PMDs for managerial leveis will he lower than the 
estimated probahility of replies and callhacks to men with PMDs. 
Hypothesis 4h. In the hiring process, lhe estimated probahility of replies and 
callhacks to women with FMDs for managerial leveis will he lower than the 
estimated probahility of replies and callhacks to men with FMDs. 
13 
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2.5. Hiring and company region 
Several advantages that companies fínd to be better for their business define their 
regional location as well as population demographic characteristics are partially behind 
economic development. Presently, company preference is the Coastal region and 
metropolitan areas of larger cities. In these regions, discrimination perceptions are 
lower, considering the high levei of social heterogeneity. 
In previous studies (Kaas and Manger, 2010; Wood et ai, 2009), was tested 
whether company's location influencing the number of each candidate's replies. Kaas 
and Manger (2010) divided the replies into three possible locaíions in Germany: south, 
east and others, noting that there was a greater discrimination against minority groups in 
eastern Germany. Wood et al. (2009) studied ethnic discrimination in various cities in 
the UK and found no statistically signifícant differences in the discrimination between 
them. Moreover, in Austrália, Booth et al. (2010) found no signifícant differences 
between the discrimination levei of various minority groups under study in the cities of 
Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane. As a consequence, we hypothesized the following: 
Hypothesis 5. During the hiring process, the gender discrimination gap against 
women in different regions of the country will he similar. 
2.6, Hiring and company size 
Since larger companies have a standardized recruitment process, more frequently 
they also discriminate less than the smaller companies (Kass and Manger, 2010). Large 
companies have more vacancies to fíll and, in principie, with a more standardized hiring 
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process, it may predict feeble discrimination. We believe that in small and medium- 
sized companies, with a less standardized hiring process, lhey will have fewer 
vacancies. But considering the number of small and medium-sized companies existent 
in the market and their difficulty in belonging to specific social and lobbying 
networking, we do believe that small and medium-sized companies preferentially use 
open internet sites specialized in hiring advertisements or specialized subcontracted 
manpower companies. Thus, they may have fewer vacancies individually, but overall, 
they may provide the majority of job advertisements in the market. Kaas and Manger 
(2010) find that small companies have a greater degree of discrimination against 
candidates from minority groups. In a different research, Carlsson and Rooth (2006) 
find that companies with more than 100 employees discriminated less, explaining that 
larger companies are expected to have a more comprehensive hiring process and less 
statistical discrimination. Stronger discrimination in small companies may indicate that 
the employer interacts more closely with his/her employees on a daily basis, which may 
let "social taste" affect his or her judgment more than with an employer in a larger 
company. The following hypotheses follow this line of argument: 
Hypothesis 6a. In the hiring process, in small companies, the esíimated prohability of 
replies and callhacks to women with PMDs is lower than the esíimated 
prohability of replies and callhacks to men with PMDs. 
Hypothesis 6h. In the hiring process, in small companies, lhe esíimated prohability of 
replies and callhacks to women with FMDs is lower than lhe estimated 
prohahility of replies and callhacks to men with FMDs. 
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3. METHODS 
We examine gender discrimination during the hiring process using the 
Corresponding Test. Our corrcspondence testing procedure measures the reply rate and 
callback rate for an interview. By means of correspondence testing, we aim to detect 
gender discrimination in the preliminary stage of the selection process, which for 
women seems to be a crucial barrier in the labor market. 
3.1. Correspondence test 
The correspondence test is a practice of social experiments in a real life situation 
that has the potential to organize statistical data on discriminatory behaviors. This 
method provides a powerful means of isolating causal mechanisms. Following Riach 
and Rich (2002, 2006), in correspondence testing, we considered four individuais that 
are matched for ali relevant characteristics other than gender. The same curriculum vitae 
can send a different signal depending on the applicanfs gender. 
The data for this study is from the callbacks of the pairs of carefully-matched 
fictitious resumes that were sent in response to real job needs posted on some internet 
websites and in the most outspread weekly newspaper (Expresso). The field experiment 
was conducted in financial, accounting and insurance activities as well as administrative 
and support services. 
For these activities, we tormed an occupational classifícation, based on the job 
advertisement description, and we dellned three occupational categories: /) executive, 
managerial and supervisory; ii) technicians and specialized workers; and, iii) clerical 
workers and administrative support. The first corresponds to better jobs and are 
associated with prestige and higher salaries. Technicians and specialized workers 
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involve less supervision but are still well paid jobs. The last category corresponds to the 
lowest salaries. 
3.2. Procedures 
The applicants have identical productive characteristics (age, qualification, job 
experience), but have a male and female name respectively, and obtained their Maste^s 
degree either in Portugal (PMD) or in a European country (FMD). If ali applicants are 
invited to a job interview, this is interpreted as a case of equal treatment, if one 
applicant is invited but another is not, this is measured as discrimination. 
With this method, we are sure that the candidates' personality and physical 
appearance will not affect the selection process to be called for the interview. The fact 
that ali applicants are fictitious allows a perfect control of observable characteristics, 
and a complete disclosure of experimental details (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; 
Carlsson and Rooth. 2007; Riach and Rich, 2002, 2006). 
3.2.1. Design of the correspondence test 
Similar to the studies of Neumark et al. (1996) and Riach and Rich (2002, 2006), 
amongst others, gender is differentiated by names, which are traditional Portuguese fírst 
names and sumames in order to avoid any possible discrimination based on race. To 
capture the impact of the observed value of high human capital, we consider two types 
of tertiary education; foreign, when the Master's degree is obtained in a business school 
outside Portugal; and, national, when it is obtained in a Portuguese business school. 
With this, we want to understand the impact of going abroad to obtain an international 
Master's degree. For this comparison, the other applicants have exactly the same levei 
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of education; however, they have a Mastei^s degree which was achieved in Portuguese 
business schools. 
The difference between lhese two types of education in the applicants should reveal 
the employer's observed human capital value, for both women and men. Each of the 
four fictitious applicants: i) one female name with a PMD; ii) one female name with a 
foreign master's degree (FMD); iii) one male name with a PMD; and, iv) one male 
name with a FMD - ali have similar experience in the finance and service sector and no 
unemployment period. 
The application letters and the curricula vitae were not strictly identical to avoid 
identification, but the applicants were carefully matched in ali essential personnel and 
ability characteristics. For each job advertisement, the four applicants were endowed 
with similar qualifications, past work experience, personnel background, marital status 
(single), hobbies, typical Portuguese first and family names, driving license, residence 
area, mobile phones and age. 
We created four e-mail addresses: these were compiled with the names of each 
applicant and are registered on hotmail.com and yahoo.com. Applicants of each 
name/MasteFs degree have different telephone numbers. 
Finally, despite the fact that we do not expect to have answers from employers by 
postal mail, we incorporated a physical address in the applications. The four physical 
addresses we used were in comparable socio-economic areas in central Portugal. 
However rare, any attempt by employers to write to applicants by postal mail can be 
measured in our experiment since the addresses are real. AH this information (names, 
addresses. phone numbers and e-mail addresses) is considered in the resumes when 
responding to the job advertisements. 
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3.2.2. Implementation of the correspondence test 
Considering that the style or the content of a particular application might influence 
employers' responses, the application letters altemated regularly among each pair of 
candidates in balanced proportion. Furthermore, the applications did not incorporate any 
photographs. In Portugal, the public institution that centralizes most of the clerical and 
managerial job offers in the labor market is the IEFP (Instituto do Emprego e Formação 
Profissional). So, we decided on the IEFP job offer portal, with daily updating. In order 
to get a larger, representative sample, we also used several private websites specialized 
in job offers and company's own web pages dedicated to recruitment, we also 
considered a weekly newspaper (Expresso) with a Section dedicated to job 
advertisements. Adopting this methodology, we are behaving as real candidates would 
in the labor market in order to fmd a job. 
3.2.3. Application ntailing 
The applications were sent between September 2010 and February 2011. In order to 
control the timespan of the job advertisement response, the four applicants' replies were 
answered online on the same day, with a gap of around one hour amongst each 
applicant, in order to avoid detection by sending the applications in at the same time 
through the websile of the advertising company. 
Besides banking and insurance activity, we have chosen to send the applications to 
ali job advertisements which matched our applicants' profiles. This means that we 
replied to adverts for accountants, controllers, budget and control technicians, auditing, 
top and middle managers, administrative technicians, staff, etc. At the beginning, we 
focused on permanent contracts for real vacancy jobs, but we found that the contract for 
I 
I 
I | 
I 
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the majority of "look like" jobs at large and well-known companies are in fact done 
vvith small recruiter companies instead of a contract with the 'dlag" company. 
3.2.4. Closing the field experiment and result analysis 
The answer to the application is recorded as 'Teply" when applicants are contacted 
for: i) asking for more information; ii) invited to an interview, and; iii) the application is 
rejected. The answer to the applicant is recorded as "callback" when applicants are 
invited for an interview. 
When an applicant received an invitation for a job interview or for some 
clarification by letter or telephone, a telephone call was made or a written answer was 
given to decline the invitation, to minimize any inconvenience to the potential 
employer. To avoid detection, in a man's application it was a male voice that would 
make the phone call and a female's voice in the reverse case. After the closing date of 
the field experiment, to validate ali the callbacks, we considered an extra period of ten 
days, waiting for the last replies. Thus, we have statistically robust confidence that the 
discrimination estimations from this study are true for the occupations we tested. 
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3.3. The statistical model 
We have prepared a set of statistical analyses to identify any gender discrimination 
during the hiring process in the Portuguese labor market. Our statistical model 
estimation would be more informative than simply comparing the numbers of men and 
women who receive callbacks for interviews. Whenever an applicant received any of 
three replies, we considered it as one reply. Moreover, when they received an invitation 
for an interview, we registered it as a callback. Within this concept, the employers 
response can be a reply to the received application (we nominated it as REPLY) and/or 
can be an invitation to an interview (that we nominated as CALLBACK). For each pair 
of comparable candidates, the possible response is: both received a reply/callback; no- 
one received one, or only one applicant received it. For the callback rate design, we 
consider the methodology of the International Labor Organization (1LO): cases where 
neither applicant is contacted or does not receive any type of reply - are disregarded. 
which means that our callback rates are calculated as follows; 
Callback First 
Callback Rate First - Reply Both + Reply only First + Reply only 
Second 
Callback Second 
Callback Rate Second = Reply Both + Reply only First + Reply only 
Second 
3.4. The variahles 
The variables of lhe study can be classified into two categories; variables that 
descri be the employers and variables that describe the applicants. Table 2 idcntifies the 
i 
variables, providing their description, scale and measures. 
I ; 
I • 
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Table 2: Variables considered in the analysis 
FXPLANATO kY 
IEMEDUNAT 
FE M EDU FOR 
MALEDUNAT 
MALEDUFOR 
BETO 10 
BETH 50 
BET5I 250 
BET251 500 
MORE50I 
LISBON 
OPORTO 
SOUTH SEASIDE 
LITORAL 
INTERIOR 
MANAGER 
TECHNICIANS 
CLERK 
CONSUMER CiOODS 
DI ST RI BUT ION 
ELECTRONICS 
P H A RM ACEUTI CS 
FINANCESERVICES 
SERVICES 
TELECOMUNICATIONS 
COMMERCE 
SUBCONTRACT 
TYPE 
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION 
HUMAN RESOURCES 
MARKETING 
PRODUCTION 
FINANCE 
IT 
LAW AND PUBLIC RELATIONS 
LOGISTICS 
A DM INI ST RATIVE 
FEMALE OCCUPATION 
Dummy variable of candidate 
Dummy variable of candidate 
Dummy v ariable of candidate 
Dummy variable of candidate 
Dummy variable of size of firm 
Dummy variable of size of firm 
Dummy variable of size of firm 
Dummy variable of size of firm 
Dummy variable of size of firm 
Dummy variable ofrcgion 
Dummy variable of region 
Dummy variable of region 
Dummy variable of region 
Dummy variable of region 
Dummy variable of function levei 
Dummy variable of function levei 
Dummy variable of function levei 
Dummy variable of induslry 
Dummy variable of induslry 
Dummy variable of industry 
Dummy variable of induslry 
Dummy variable of industry 
Dummy variable of industry 
Dummy variable of induslry 
Dummy variable of industry 
Dummy variaNe of recruiter 
Dummy variable of nacionality 
Dummy variable of occupation 
Dummy variable of occupation 
Dummy v ariable of occupation 
Dummy variable of occupation 
Dummy variable of occupation 
Dummy variable of occupation 
Dummy variable of occupation 
Dummy variable of occupation 
Dummy variable of occupation 
Dummy variable of dispersion 
Binary I =if a woman applicant with Portuguese master degree 
0=no 
Binary l =if a woman applicant with foreign master degree 
Orno 
Binary Mf a man applicant with Portuguese master degree 
0-T1O 
Binary 1 -=if a man applicant with foreign master degree 
O^o 
Binary 1 -if firm has between MO employees 
0 -no 
Binary I Nf firm has between 11-50 employees 
0rno 
Binary l=if firm has between 51-250 employees 
0=no 
Binary I if firm has between 251 -500 employees 
O^no 
Binary l =if firm has more than 501 employees 
O^no 
Binary I =if location is in Lisbon region 
0-no 
Binary I ^if location is in Oporto region 
0; no 
Binary I ~if location is in South/ Scaside region 
0-"TlO 
Binary 1 =if location is in Litoral region 
O-TIO 
Binary I Hf location is in Interior region 
0=n o 
Binary I -if the job ad is for manager posiíion 
0=110 
Binary l Hf the job ad is for technician position 
0=no 
Binary IHfthe jobad is for clerk position 
0-71 o 
Binary I Hf the job ad is in the consumer goods industry 
0—TIO 
Binary I Hf lhe jobad is in the distribui ion industry 
0-no 
Binary I Hf the job ad is in the electronic industry 
0-no 
Binary I Hf the job ad is in the pharmaceitic industry 
0:no 
Binary I Hf the job ad is in the finance service induslry 
0=no 
Binary I Hf the job ad is in the service industry 
0=no 
Binary IHfthe jobad is in the telecomunicai ion industry 
0=no 
Binary IHfthe jobad isin the commerce industry 
0=no 
Binary 1 Hf the recruiter is a specialized company 
0=no 
Binary I Hf firm is nalional owned 
0=no 
Binary I Hf lhe job ad is for general administrai ion area 
0 TIO 
Binary I Hf the job ad is for human rcsources area 
0 -no 
Binary I Hf lhe job ad is for marketing area 
0=no 
Binary I Hf the job ad is for produclion area 
0=no 
Binary I Hf the job ad is for fmancc area 
0 no 
Binary I Hf lhe job ad is for IT arca 
0-no 
Binary I ^if the job ad is for law and public relations area 
0=no 
Binary I nf the jobad is for logistics arca 
0 no 
Binary I Hf the job ad is for administraiive area 
Ono 
Binary I Hf the job ad is for Gen. Adm . HR or Administrai ive 
0 no 
22 
ANA MARGARIDA DUARTE THE IMPACT OF GENDER ON THE FIRST PHASE OF HIR1NG PR(X"ESS: 23 
FIELD EXPERIMENTS IN PORTUGAL 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Following Riach and Rich (2002), we present the full results of our field 
experiment. This includes the procedure adopted and the complete results of ali tests, 
broken down into ali variables considered in the study. We considered the percentage of 
times that potential employers treated the four applicants differently compared to a 
reference individual (woman with a national Master's degree). Comprehensive results 
thus cover: when both were rejected or invited and when only the female or male 
applicant received a reply or was invited to an interview. The outcome of our 
correspondence testing was thus first set out in a format that followed Riach and Rich 
(2002). 
Hiring and gender 
The figures in Table 3 compare the results of the female applicant with a PMD with 
the results of the other applicants. 
Table 3: Descriptive Results for Correspondence Testing - Ali Jobs 
llqdv 
Both 
Itqdv 
\ftill' 
Iloplv Hnlv 
lírsl 
Reply 
llnlv 
Seiond 
Cali Back Cali llaek 
FirsI Seeond 
Cali llark 
Rale Una 
("»| 
Cali llark 
Rale Second 
(Ai) 
lliílerenre 
(P-P-) X
1 
Ali Applicanls Total Jub,s= .>05 
FcmEdiiVat vi s. IcmbliiFnr % ri III fdt III 21 :oo III0» ■II) 6.77' 
IcmHdiiVal y. (. HalFduNal 2') iii:í t: 26 17 21 1:% 2l0o -1 ()..')2 
KcmlídiAal v i. MalFdiílnr :í:i :!% i:t :í;í I:I 2:1 l2°o 2 Pé MB"* 
Notes: This table reports, for each respondent group and in total, in how many cases both of the 
applicants, no applicants, only the first or only the second applicant received a contact (positive or 
negative); and, in how many cases the woman with a PMD was invited to an interview (Callback First) as 
well as in how many cases each respondent group was invited to an interview (Callback Second); the 
callback rates for the applicants and the difference in callback rates are also presented. FemEduNat = 
Woman with a PMD. FemEduFor = Woman with a FM D. MalEduNat = Man with a PMD. MalEduFor = 
Man with a FM D. Significance of.V;: *, **, *** indicates that the observed difference is statistically 
significam at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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The results of our matched applications estimate lhe presence and extent of 
discrimination in hiring, and whether it is statistically significam. This table shows that 
505 employers participated, corresponding to 2,020 joh applications sent out to the four 
candidates. The first row compares the result for the woman with a PMD and the 
woman with a FMD. In 36 cases, both were contacted (column 1), in 371 cases, none 
were contacted (column 2), in 40 cases, only the woman with a PMD was contacted 
(column 3), and in 58 cases, only the woman with a FMD was contacted (column 4). Of 
these contacts the result was: in 10 cases, the woman with a PMD was invited to an 
interview (column 5), and in 24 cases, the woman with a FMD was invited to an 
interview (column 6). The next two columns show that the callback rate is 0.07 for the 
woman with a PMD and 0.18 for the woman with a FMD. In column 9, we present the 
difference in a callback rate of 10 percentage points which, as shown by X2 (column 10) 
is statistically significam at 1% significance levei. The other two lines present the 
results in a similar way, but for men with a PMD and a FMD. Averaging across ali jobs, 
we observe substantial discrimination against female candidates with a PMD. As shown 
by X2, differences between women and men with a FMD are statistically significam at 
1% and 10%, respectively. The differences between applicants are easy to see in Graph 
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Next tables present the results by company size, region, function levei, type, and 
female dominated occupations in a similar way. 
Hiring, gender and human capital 
Based on Table 3, we can see that employers perceive foreign education achieved 
by both candidates (women and men). Differences are statistically significant at 1% 
signifícance levei for women and at 10% signifícance levei for men. We fínd an 
irrelevant perception between men and women, showing that there is no discrimination. 
Hiring, gender and dispersion 
Results show that in female dominated occupations (see Table 4 and Graph 2), 
women with FMD are preferred in comparison to other women (difference is 
statistically significant at 1% signifícance levei). In addition, women have more 
invitations than men in both situations showing that in female dominated occupations, 
there is discrimination against men. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Results for Correspondence Testing - Female Dominated 
Occupations 
lleplv 
llolh 
Iteply 
Mone 
lleply Onlv 
Firsl 
Rcply 
Onlv 
Second 
Cali Back 
Fmsl 
Cali llack 
Second 
Cali llack 
Bale First 
(%) 
Cali Back 
Bale Second 
(%) 
Diflerence 
(P-P-) \
2 
Female llomiiiated Occupalions Jobs = 99 
FemtduNal vs. FemEduFor 6 73 20 (1 0 6 0% 23% -23 7,8* 
FemEduNal vs. MalEduNal 1 84 14 0 5 3 33% 20% 13 OJ 
EemEduNal vs. MalEduFor 2 85 12 0 4 3 29% 21% 7 0,19 
Notes: Similar notes as for Table 3. 
Gender stereotyping is one of the explanations that might cause this pro-female bias 
in occupations that are heavily female. More research remains to be done in teasing out 
the workings of these demand-side mechanisms. 
Graph 2: Descriptive Results for Correspondence Testing - Female Dominated 
Occupations 
FemEduFoi 
15° ò Female Dominated Occupations 
MalHckiFor 
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LO 
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Hiring and the glass-ceiling 
By function levei, Table 5 and Graph 3 show that differences in callbacks can be 
observed in lower levei job positions. In these less demanding skilled jobs, 
discrimination against women persists and they are requested to have higher leveis of 
education. This situation is extremely serious in this crisis period, because it prevents 
women from getting normal, available jobs from the labor market. 
Table 5: Descriptive Results for Correspondence Testing - Function Levei 
llcjily 
II» ih 
llc|ily 
Nonc 
llc|)ly llnly 
First 
Reply 
Only 
Second 
Fali Itack 
First 
Fali llack 
Sccond 
Fali llack 
Rale Firsl 
(%) 
Fali llack 
Rale Sccond 
(%) 
Difference 
(P-P-) A'
2 
Function Levei Managers Jolis = 49 
FemliduNal vs. FemEdiiFor 6 37 6 1) 0 (1 0% 0% 0 - 
FeinEduMal vs. MalEdaNal 2 41 6 0 4 0 50% 0% 50 8* 
FemliduNal vs. MalEduFor 3 41 5 0 3 0 30% 0% 311 4,8** 
Function Levei Teclinicians Jobs = 227 
FemliduNal vs. FemEduFor III lill 36 0 4 11 9% 17% -9 1,56 
FemliduNal vs. MalliduMal 10 190 27 0 4 7 11% 19% -8 0,97 
FemliduNal vs. MalFduFor 1) 1117 32 0 6 9 15% 21% -8 0.75 
Functions Levei Clerk jobs = 229 
FemliduNal vs. FemFduFor 21) 153 56 1) 6 16 11% 21% -13 5,51** 
FemliduNal vs. tlalliduNal 17 172 40 0 9 14 16% 25% -9 1,38 
FemliduNal vs. MalEduFor 22 16(1 39 1) 4 14 7% 23% -16 6,88' 
Notes: Similar notes as for Table 3. 
However, in managerial ranks, where higher leveis of abilities are required, the 
discrimination is against men. Results show a gap of 38% against men with FMD (the 
difference is statistically significant at a 5% significance levei). The difference found 
for women with PMD suggests that a man with a FMD is, on average, more likely to get 
a callback compared to a man with a PMD. 
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Graph 3: Descriptive Results for Correspondence Testing - Function Levei 
FeniHduFor 509 o 
MalEduFor NIaIEdu!NTat 
Function Levei; Nlanagers 
-Function I.evel: Techniciatts 
Function Levei: Clcrk 
Hiring and the company region 
When comparing ali the callback rates by regions (see Table 6 and Graph 4) we 
generally fmd that differences are against women, but the values are not statistically 
signifícant. It is worth noting that there is no strong evidence that companies in different 
regions favor women or men. So we can only note that, generally, companies do not 
prefer women with PMD- 
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Table 6: Descriptive Results for Correspondence Testing - Region 
lleply 
Bolh 
lle|dy 
None 
lleply llnly 
First 
lleply 
Only 
Sccond 
Cali Itack 
Fiist 
Cali Back 
Sccuud 
Cali Back 
Ha te Fiisl 
(%) 
Cali Back 
llate Second 
(%) 
Ditterence , 
(P-P-) A 
Region: Lisbon jobs = 364 
FemEduNat vs. FcmFduFor 24 268 72 0 9 15 9% 16% -6 1,73 
FemEduNal vs. MalEduNat 19 294 51 (1 14 13 20% 19% -1 0,05 
FemEduNal vs. MalEduFor 24 291 49 0 9 13 12% 18% -5 0,86 
Region: Oporto jobs = 63 
FemEduNal vs. FcmFduFor 3 48 12 0 0 1 0% 27% ■27 5,45** 
FemEduNal vs. MalEduNat 2 53 8 0 1 1 10% 10% 0 0 
FemEduNal vs. MalEduFor 1 49 13 0 2 4 14% 29% -14 0,88 
llcgion: Soiilh/Seaside Johs = 13 
FemEduNal vs. FemEduFor 0 11) 3 (1 0 1 0% 33% -33 1,5 
FemEduNat vs. MalEduNat 0 13 0 () 0 0 0% 0% 0 
FemEduNal vs. MalEduFor 0 12 1 0 II 1 11% 11X1% -100 
Region: Litoral jobs = 31 
FemEduNal vs. FemEduFor 6 2(1 5 II 0 2 (t% 18% -18 2,44 
FemEduNal vs. MalEduNat 6 19 6 0 (1 3 0% 25% -25 4** 
FemEduNat vs. MalEduFor ã 18 8 (1 1 3 8% 23% -15 1,24 
Region: Interior jobs = 34 
FemEduNal vs. FemEduFor 3 25 6 (1 1 2 11% 22% -II 0,41 
FemEduNal vs. MalEduNat 2 24 8 0 2 4 20% 48% -20 1 
FemEduNal vs. MalEduFor 3 26 5 (1 1 2 13% 25% -13 0,42 
Notes; Similar notes as for Table 3. 
The Lisbon and Oporto regions preferred women with FMD, revealing that 
employers recognize and give importance to human capital investment, thereby 
expecting a higher productivity. The difference in the number of callbacks for Oporto is 
statistically significant at the 5% levei. 
Graph 4: Descriptive Results for Correspondence Testing - Region 
Reaion: Interior 
Resion; Lisbon 
20° o 
0o o 
90° 
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 Mal EduFor 
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Hiring and company size 
Table 7 and Graph 5 show a substantial heterogeneity over company size. The 
discrimination levei against women is exceedingly high for medium-sized companies 
(between 51-250 employees). 
Table 7: Descriptive Results for Correspondence Testing - Company Size 
Iteply 
lio III 
llcply 
Nonc 
Rcply Only 
Firsl 
Rcply 
fluly 
Second 
liall llack 
Firsl 
Cali llack 
Second 
Cali llack 
llalc Firsl 
(%) 
Cali llack 
llalc Second 
(%) 
DKIcrencc 
(Pd'-) r' 
llegion: tisbon jobs = Md 
FcmliduNal vs. FcmliduFor 24 2611 72 (1 9 15 9% 10% -6 1,73 
FemliduNal vs. MallidnNal 19 294 51 1) 14 13 20% 19% -1 0,05 
FcmliduNal vs, MalFduFor 24 291 49 0 9 13 12% 1896 -5 0,86 
llegion: Oporlo Jobs = 6i! 
FcmliduNal vs. FcmliduFor 3 48 12 II 1) 4 0% 27% -27 5,45" 
FcmliduNal vs. MallidnNal 2 53 II 0 1 1 10% 10% 0 0 
FcmliduNal vs. MalFduFor 1 49 13 (1 2 4 14% 29% -14 0,88 
Hcgion: Soulh/Seaside Jobs = li! 
0 FcmliduNal vs. FcmliduFor (1 Kl 3 II 1 0% 33% -33 1.5 
FcmliduNal vs. MallidnNal 0 13 (1 II 0 (1 0% (1% 0 - 
FcmliduNal vs. MalFduFor 0 12 1 1) (1 1 0% 100% -100 
llegion; Liloral Jobs = iil 
FcmliduNal vs. FcmliduFor li 21) 1) 1) 2 0% 18% -III 2,44 
FcmliduNal vs. MallidnNal 6 19 6 II 0 3 0% 25% -25 /j** 
FcmliduNal vs. MalFduFor 5 III II 1) 1 3 11% 23% ■15 1.24 
llegion; Inlerior Jobs = 34 
FcmliduNal vs. FcmliduFor 3 25 6 1) 1 2 11% 22% -il 0,41 
FcmliduNal vs, MalliduNat 2 24 II II 2 4 20% -1(1% -20 1 
FcmliduNal vs. MalFduFor 3 26 5 (1 1 2 13% 25% -13 0,42 
Notes: Similar notes as for Table 3. 
As shown by X2, this difference is statistically significant at 10% levei. We fínd 
higher discrimination against women in a medium-sized company, which means that we 
cannot state that larger companies have lower discrimination leveis. 
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Graph 5: Descriptive Results for Correspondence Testing - Company Size 
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Type and subcontracting recruiter 
Considering that companies are domestic or multinational, we can also analyze the 
comparison of callback rate (see Table 8 and Graphs 6 and 7), and we are able to fínd 
that the discrimination gap is more pronounced in multinational companies and it is 
against women applicants with local Master's degrees. Again, employers prefer female 
applicants with FMD. As X2 shows, this difference is statistically significant at 10% 
levei. 
Table 8: Descriptive Results for Correspondence Testing - Subcontracting and 
Company Type 
Iteply 
lio III 
Rcply 
Nonc 
Iteply lluly 
Firsl 
Iteply 
lluly 
Secoud 
Cali llack 
Firsl 
Cali llack 
Secoud 
Cali llack 
llale Firsl 
(%) 
Cali Back 
llale Secou d 
(%) 
lliflercnce 
(P-P-) r' 
Subconlract Jobs = 75 
FemEduNal vs. FemEduFor 4 48 23 11 4 0 15% 22% -7 0,5 
FemliduNal vs. MalEduNal 6 5(1 11 0 2 4 12% 24% -12 (1,83 
FemEduNal vs. MalEduFor 4 53 11) II 4 7 111% 32% -14 1,12 
Iteply 
llolh 
Iteply 
No ne 
Iteply lluly 
First 
Rcply 
lluly 
Sccond 
Cali llack 
Firsl 
Cali llack 
Sccond 
Cali llack 
llalc Firsl 
(%) 
Cali llack 
llalc Sccond 
(%) 
Diltercuce 
(P-P-) A'
2 
Type - Multinational Jobs = 307 
FemEduNal vs. FemEduFor 22 2211 57 II 1 15 9% 19% -Kl 3,45*** 
FemEduNal vs. MalEduNal 21 251 35 II li 12 14% 21% -7 0,98 
FemEduNal vs. MalEduFor 21 245 41 0 11 13 13% 21% -II 1,45 
Notes: Similar notes as for Table 3. 
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Graph 6: Descriptive Results for Correspondence Testing - Subcontracting 
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4.2. Modeling discrimination 
The main goal of this thesis is to identify any gender-related determinants of 
discrimination during the hiring processes in the Portuguese labor market. In order to 
perform further statistical tests on the data, we estimate separate Logit models to 
estimate the probability of receiving a reply or a callback for a joh interview: 
T,*ri^eply=l) =a + GX, + C//, (1) 
Yl*(Ca\\hack=l)=a + GXi + eiI, (2) 
where; Y* is the latent variable retlecting the probability of receiving a reply or/and a 
callback for a job interview, a is a constant, X refers to gender, which equals one (zero) 
if the candidate is female (in ali other cases), e is the disturbance, and / refers to the 
individual. In correspondence testing (see Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Carlsson 
and Rooth, 2007; Riach and Rich, 2002), ali applicants must be matched in ali 
characteristics other than gender. Having controlled ali the characteristics except gender 
in two applicants, the latter was not expected to be correlated with the error term in each 
equation. If G =0 the female and male applicants had the same probability of receiving a 
reply or/and a callback for a job interview. If G <0, the female applicant had a lower 
probability of receiving reply or/and a callback for a job interview than the male, 
whereas if G >0, the female applicant had a higher probability of receiving reply or/and 
a callback for a job interview than the male. As our data allows the investigation of 
whether the determinants of the REPLY have the same behavior as those of 
CALLBACK, we estimated two regressions for each hypothesis we want to test. 
This permits us to test for differences in the discrimination against each of the four 
groups, while controlling other variables and defining whether discrimination relates to 
lhose variables. Firstly, we analyze the differences between the estimated probabilities 
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of receiving a reply after sending applications to employment advertisements as well as 
the differences in the estimated probability of being invited to the interview (callback) 
for the four applicants. Secondly, we determine which variable (if any) is associated 
with treating the applicants differently, analyzing the relation between company-specific 
attributes and job characteristics. The purpose is to investigate what typifíes employers 
that act in function of the applicant name and/or of their qualifications. 
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5. DISCUSSION AND RESULT ANALYSIS 
Tables 9 and 10 show the results. As can be seen, the estimated models are 
statistically signifícant according to the Likelihood-Ratio (LR) probability test and the 
explanatory power evaluated by the McFadden R-squared (the figure is around 13% in 
REPLY and in CALLBACK). 
Table 9: Estimation of the model of REPLIES - Hiring and Gender 
Variable Coefficient Sld. Error z -Statistic Prob. 
CONSUMER _GOODS 0,372 0,568 0,655 0,513 
COMMERCE -2.309 0,647 -3.569 0,000 » 
DISTR1BUTION 1,427 0,41 1 3,474 0,001 * 
ELECTRONICS -0,506 0,405 -1,250 031 1 
SERVICES 0,857 0,306 2,800 0,005 * 
EINANCE_SER VICES 1,021 0,423 2.412 0,016 * * 
TELECOMUNICATIONS 1,328 0,508 2,615 0,009 * 
LISBON -0.631 0,308 -2.047 0,041 ** 
OPORTO -0.896 0,377 -2,375 0,018 ** 
SOUTH SEASIDE -1.980 0.881 -2,248 0,025 * >♦« 
LITORAL 0,230 0,379 0,608 0.543 
TYPE 0,290 0,233 1,247 0313 
BETOIO 0,282 0,741 0,380 0,704 
BET_1150 -0,222 0,276 -0,805 0,421 
BET51_250 0,149 0,353 0,423 0,672 
BET'251 500 -0,885 0,470 -1,881 0,060 *** 
MANAGER -0.867 0,572 -1,515 0,130 
TECHNICIAN -0,571 0,170 -3355 0,001 
OEN_ADM_ 2,177 0.673 3,237 0,001 * 
ETN ANCE 1,019 0,344 2,966 0,003 * 
HR 0,169 0,806 0,210 0,834 
MARKETING 1,964 0.325 6,047 0,000 * 
SUBCONTRACT 0,374 0,215 1,740 0,082 *** 
FEMEDUFOR 0,340 0,219 1.551 0.121 
MA L.EDU N AT 0,105 0,228 0,460 0.646 
MALEDUFOR 0,256 0.223 1,149 0350 
C -3,505 0,520 -6.735 0,000 * 
McFadden R-squarcd 0.168454 Mean depcndent var 0.105002 
S.D. dependem var 0.306633 S.E. of regression 0.287054 
Akaikc info critcrion 0.585441 Sum squared resid 1.641.405 
Schwarz criterion 0.660468 L«g likelihood -5.640.029 
1 lannan-Quinn criter. 0.612976 Restr. log likelihood -6.782.579 
LR statistic 2.285.099 Avg. k)g likelihood -0.279348 
Prob(LR statistic) 0.000000 
Obs with Dep=0 1807 Total obs 2019 
Obs with Dep=l 212 
Notes; Depcndent variable is REPLY. Logit model has been estimated by maximum 
likelihood, using the econometrics software Eviews. Method: ML-Binary Logit (Quadratic 
hill climbing), with QML (Huber/White test) standard errors and covariance. Due to lhe 
dummy variables trap, omitted variables are Ol HERS, INT ERIOR, IVIORE50I, CLERK, 
IT, LAW PUB REL, PRODUCTION, LOGISTICS, ADMINISTRATIVE, 
FEMEDUNAT. *p<0.01; ♦♦p<().05: ♦♦*?< 0.1. 
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Table 10: Estimation ot the model of CALLBACKS - Hiring and Gender 
Variable Coeffic ient Std. Error z -Statistie Prob. 
CONSUMERGOODS -0,272 0,553 -0,491 0,623 
COMMERCE -1,354 0,424 -3,192 0,001 * 
DISTRIB U TI O N 0,8 14 0,405 2,008 0,045 
ELECTRONICS -0,549 0,329 -1,67 1 0,095 ** * 
PHARMACEUTICS - 1,0 1 0 0,624 -1,619 0,106 
SERVICES 0,617 0,247 2,494 0,013 >•« >*» 
El NANCE_SER VICES 1,006 0,353 2,851 0,004 * 
TELECOMUNICATION 0,224 0,545 0,4 1 1 0,68 1 
LISBON -0,577 0,269 -2,148 0,032 
OPORTO -0,695 0,326 -2,130 0,033 * >l« 
SOLÍTUSEASIDE -1,457 0,641 -2,272 0,023 * >♦« 
LITORAL 0^230 0,344 0,670 0,503 
TVPE 0,1 26 0,2 1 1 0,596 0,55 I 
BET_0_ 10 -0,2 02 0,670 -0,301 0,763 
BET l 1 50 -0,347 03253 - 1,370 0,171 
BET_5 1250 -0,055 0,284 -0,1 95 0,845 
BET 251500 -0,1 83 0,402 -0,455 0,649 
MANAGER -0,982 0,490 -2,003 0,045 * »»« 
TECH NIC IAN -0,499 0,145 -3,442 0,00 1 >♦« 
GEN ADM 1,878 0,580 3,237 o,ooi * 
FINANCE 0,740 0,258 2,868 0,004 * 
HR -0,697 0,773 -0,901 0,367 
LAWPUBREL -0,088 0,746 -0,1 1 8 0,906 
MARKETING 1,422 0,250 5,68 1 0,000 * 
SUBCONTRACT 0,367 0,185 1,986 0,047 ** 
FEMEDUFOR 0,291 0,1 80 1,617 0,106 
MALEDUNAT -0,415 0,200 -2,076 0,038 * * 
MALEDUFOR -0,1 84 0,190 -0,969 0,333 
C -2,174 0,426 -5,102 0,000 >»« 
McFadden R-squared 0,1328 Mean dependent var 0,1441 
S.O. dependent var «,35 12 S.E. of regression 033304 
Akaike info criterion 0,7438 Sum squared resid 2,1728 
Sehwarz criterion 0,8243 Log likelihood -732220 
1 lannan-Quinn criter. 0,7733 Restr. log likelihood -8,3277 
LR slatislic 2,21 15 Avg. kig likelihood -0,3575 
ProtKLR statistie) 0,0000 
Obs with Dep=0 1.729 Total obs 2.020 
Obs with E>ep=l 291 
Notes; Dependent variable is CALL. Logií model has been estimated by maximum 
likelihood, using the econometrics software Eviews. Method: ML-Binary Logit (Quadratic 
hill climbing), with QML (Huber/White test) standard errors and covariance. Due to the 
dummy variables trap, omitted variables are OFHERS, INTERIOR, MORE501, CLERK, 
IT, PRODUCTION, LOGISTICS, ADM1NISTRATIVE, FEMEDUNAT. *p<0.01; 
**p<0.05; ♦♦*p< 0.1. 
As we have several dummies in the explanatory variables set and due to the períect 
co-linearity problems (the dummies trap), the dummy female applicant with a 
Portuguese Mastefs degree has been excluded (FEMEDUNAT). This is the reference 
variable, providing a suitable way to distinguish the difference between the female 
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applicants with the FMD (FEMEDUFOR), the male applicants with PMD 
(MALEDUNAT) and the male applicants with FMD (MALEDUFOR). 
In the model with REPLY as a dependent variable (Table 9), the estimates for the 
coefficients of variables FEMEDUFOR, MALEDUNAT and MALEDUFOR are ali 
positive but not statistically signifícant. These results suggest non-existent 
discrimination against women with PMD. Nevertheless, in the model with CALLBACK 
as a dependent variable, the estimates for the coefficient of the variable MALEDUNAT 
is negative and statistically signifícant (at 5% signifícance levei). With these results, we 
can conclude that, on average, female applicants with a PMD have higher estimated 
probabilities of receiving an invitation for an interview than male applicants with PMD. 
This result is consistent with other research (Fernandez and Weinberg, 1997). This is 
not in accordance with our hypotheses and the identifíed pattem in other research, that 
is, women would be treated unequally. Thus, these results do not support our 
hypotheses la and 1b where we predicted discrimination against women in the hiring 
process. 
Next, we analyze whether the estimated probability of being contacted or offered to 
attend an interview varies between applicants with PMD and applicants with FMD. 
Testing for hypothesis 2a, we use previous Logit models to analyze how the offer 
estimation probability varies. In both, the REPLY model and the CALE model, the 
coefficient of the variable FEMEDUFOR is not statistically signifícant. For hypothesis 
2b (see Table 11 for callback model, in Annex I we present the reply model), the 
coefficient of the variable MALEDUFOR is not statistically signifícant. Both 
hypotheses suggest that employers neglect applicants' human capital skill. Hypothesis 
2c anticipated that the estimated probability of replies and of callbacks to women with 
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FMD would be lower than the estimated probability of replies and of callbacks to men 
with a national Master's degree. Our fmdings are twofold: in REPLY model (see Annex 
III), the coefficients of the variables are not statistically significant and in the CALL 
model (see Annex II), the coefficients of MALEDIJNAT and MALEDUFOR are 
negative and statistically significant at 1% of significance levei. 
Table 11: Estimation of the model of CALLBACKS - Hiring, gender and human capital 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z- ■Statistic Prob. 
CONSUMER GOODS 0,045 0,500 0,090 0,928 
COMMERCE -1,144 0,410 -2,794 0,005 ♦ 
D1STRIBUTION 1,090 0,366 2,974 0,003 * 
ELECTRONICS -0,360 0226 -1,105 0269 
SERVICES 0,789 0247 3,195 0,001 >♦« 
FINANCE_SER VICES 121 1 0.340 3,565 0,000 * 
TELECOMUNICATIONS 0,609 0,488 1247 0212 
L1SBON -0,536 0266 -2,013 0,044 
OPORTO -0,671 0,325 -2,061 0,039 ** 
SOU FM SEASIDE -1,413 0,641 -2203 0.028 ** 
LITORAL 0244 0,343 0.712 0,476 
TYPE 0,180 0204 0,882 0278 
BETO 10 -0232 0,668 -0,348 0,728 
BETJ 150 -0,358 0251 -1.427 0,154 
BET_51_250 -0,100 0282 -0,356 0,722 
BET 251 5(K) -0,517 0.349 -1.483 0,138 
MANAGER -0,954 0,482 -1,980 0,048 ** 
TECHNICI AN -0,503 0.145 -3,460 0,001 
GEN_ADM_ 1,845 0,569 3243 0,001 * 
1 INANCE 0,747 0250 2,989 0,003 ♦ 
1 IR -0,694 0,771 -0,901 0,368 
MARKETING 1295 0237 5,882 0,000 ♦ 
SUBCON FRACT 0233 0,184 1,809 0,070 *♦ 
FEMEDUFOR 0,704 0,193 3,642 0,000 ♦ 
MALEDUFOR 0,230 0,203 1,130 0258 
FEMEDUNAT 0,414 0,199 2,074 0,038 ** 
C -2,797 0,426 -6,558 0,000 * 
McEadden R-squared 0.1310 Mean dependent var 0,1441 
S.D. dependent var 0,3512 S.E. of regression 0,3306 
Akaike info criterkm 0.7432 Sutn squared reskl 217.8421 
Schwarz criterkm 0,8182 Log likelihood -723,6572 
1 lannan-Quinn criter. 0,7707 Restr. bg likelihood -832.7745 
LR statistic 2182346 Avg. k)g likelihood -0,3582 
ProNLR statistic) 0,0000 
Obs with Dep=0 1.729 Total obs 2.020 
Ohs with l)ep=l 291 
Notes: Dependent variable is CALL. Logit model has been estimated by maximum 
likelihood, using the econometrics sottware Eviews. Method: ML-Binary Logit (Quadratic 
hill climbing), with QML (tluber/White test) standard errors and covariance. Due to the 
dummy variables trap, omitted variables are OLHERS, INTERIOR, MORE501, CLERK, 
LAW PUB REL, PRODUCTION, LOG1STICS, ADMINISTRATIVE, MALEDUNAT. 
*p<0.01; **p<0.05; ♦♦♦p<0.L 
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These findings suggest that women present a higher estimated probability in 
receiving callbacks. These results show similar conclusions as other research (Bertrand 
and Hallock, 2001). Thereíbre, we cannot accept the null hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c. 
Subsequently, we considered how gender and dispersion relates to discrimination (if 
any). To analyze the impact of company size in the number of replies and callback 
among the applicant groups, we create the variable FEMALE DOMIN, which includes 
the following areas: General Administration, Human Relations and Administrative 
[following similar criteria of Ortin Angel and Salas Fumas (1998)]. In order to test for 
hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c, we created four dummy variables with the interaction effect 
among the four applicant variables as well as the female dominated variable and 
estimated two Logit models for each dependent dummy variable: REPLY (see Annex 
IV) and CALLBACK (see Table 12). 
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Table 12; Estimation of the model of CALLBACKS - Hiring, gender and 
dispersion 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic P rob. 
CONSUMER GOODS -0,257 0,564 -0,455 0.649 
COMMERCE -1,354 0,418 -3,242 0,001 * 
DISTRIBUTION 0,831 0,409 2,033 0,042 ** 
ELECTRONICS -0,538 0,329 -1,636 0,102 
PHARMACEUT1CS -0,995 0,622 -1,599 0,1 10 
SERVICES 0,613 0,250 2,449 0,014 ** 
FINANCE SERVICES 1,005 0,35 1 2,861 0,004 * 
TELECOMUNICATIONS 0,235 0,550 0,428 0,669 
LISBON -0,571 0,266 -2,147 0,032 * ♦ 
OPORTO -0,693 0,326 -2,123 0,034 4141 
SOUTH SEASIDE -1,483 0,660 -2,245 0.025 >•«* 
LITORAL 0,229 0,342 0,671 0,502 
TYPE 0,124 0,213 0,582 0,560 
BET 0 10 -0,233 0,687 -0,339 0.735 
BET 11 50 -0,341 0,255 
-1,339 0,1 81 
BET_51 250 -0,056 0,282 -0,198 0,843 
BET 251 500 -0,186 0,407 -0,456 0,648 
MANAGER -0,959 0,503 -1,904 0,057 * * * 
TECHNICIAN -0,472 0,146 -3,224 0,001 * 
GEN ADM 1,817 0,634 2,867 0.004 * 
FINANCE 1,033 0,3 12 3,307 0.001 * 
HR -0,875 0,825 -1,061 0,289 
LA WPUBREL 0,219 0,791 0,277 0.781 
MARKETING 1,718 0,309 5,552 0.000 
SUBCONTRACT 0,369 0,185 1,992 0,046 
FEMEDUFORTEMALE DOMIN 1,438 0,441 3.261 0,001 * 
MALEDUN AT*FEMALE_DOMIN -0,354 0.615 -0,576 0,565 
MALEDUFOR*FEMALE DOMIN 
-0,354 0,597 -0.592 0,554 
C -2,545 0,458 -5,562 0.000 * 
McFadden R-squarcd 0,1364 Mcan dependent var 0.1441 
S.D. dependent var 0,35 12 S.E. of regression 0,3307 
Akaike info criterion 0,7408 Sum squared resid 217,710 
Schwarz criterion 0.8213 Log likelihood -719,195 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0,7704 Restr. log likelihood 
-832,775 
LR statistic 227,1581 Avg. log likelihood 
-0.3560 
Prob(LR statistic) 0,0000 
Obs with Dep^O 1.729 Total obs 2.020 
Obs with Dep' 1 291 
Notes: Dependent variable is CALL. Logit model has been estimated by maximum 
likelihood, using the econometrics software Eviews. Method: ML-Binary Logit (Quadratic 
hill climbing), with QML (Huber/White test) standard errors and covariance. Due to the 
dummy variables trap, omitted variables are OTHERS, INTERIOR, MORE501, CLERK, 
PRODUCTION, LOG1STICS, ADMIN 1STRATIVE, FEMEDUNAPFEMALE DOMIN, 
*p<0.01; **p<0.05; ***p< 0.1. 
Results suggest that in female dominated occupations, women with PMD are not 
positively discriminated against men with PMD (the coefficients are not statistically 
signifícant). Additionally, we find that women with FMD, in female dominated 
occupations, present a higher probability to receive callbacks than men with FMD. The 
coefílcient of MALEDUFOR*FEMALE_DOMlN is negative and statistically 
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significant at 5% of significance levei. Furthermore, our results suggest that women 
with a FMD present a higher probability in getting replies and callbacks than women 
with PMD. ín both models (see Annexes V and VI), the coefficients of the variable 
FEMEDUFOR*FEMALE_DOMIN are statistically significant (at a 5% and 1% 
signifícance levei respectively). Thus, we can confirm hypothesis 3c. 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b anticipated that the estimated probability of replies and 
callbacks to female applicants for job advertisements at management levei would be 
lower than for men no matter what the human capital skills. As shown in our model (see 
Table 13), analyzing the outcome of the occupation levei with applicants, we find that 
women with PMD (FEMEDUNAT) present the highest estimated probability in getting 
replies and receiving callbacks than men with PMD, the coefficients are statistically 
significant (at 10% and 5% signifícance levei). We also find that women with PMD 
have the highest estimated probability in receiving callbacks for managerial positioned 
advertisements. 
41 
ANA MARGARIDA DUARTE THE 1MPACT CF GENDER ON THE FIRST PHASE OF HIRING PROCESS: 42 
FIELD EXPER1MENTS IN PORTUGAL 
Table 13: Estimation ofthe model of CALLBACKS - Hiring and glass-ceiling 
(H4a) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z -Statistic Prob. 
CONSUMER GOODS -0,225 0,560 -0,402 0,688 
COMMERCE -1^87 0,418 -3,078 0,002 * 
DISTRIBUTION 0,841 0,401 2,096 0,036 ** 
ELECTRONICS -0,512 0,325 -1,573 0,1 16 
PHARMACEUTICS -1,004 0,608 -1,651 0,099 >•«* 
SERVICES 0,655 0,248 2,642 0,008 ♦ 
FINANCE SERVICEÍS 1,084 0345 3,139 0,002 ♦ 
TELECOMUNICATTONS 0,344 0,551 0,624 0.533 
LISBON -0,568 0,266 -2,137 0,033 ** 
OPORTO -0,724 0,326 -2,225 0,026 + * 
SOUTH SEASIDE -1,425 0,656 -2,173 0,030 ** 
LITORAL 0,201 0,341 0.590 0,555 
TYPE 0,143 0,209 0,493 
BETOU) -0,250 0,642 -0389 0,698 
BET_11_50 -0,317 0,251 -1366 0,206 
BET_51 250 -0,029 0,277 -0,103 0,918 
BET_251 500 -0,183 0,398 -0,460 0,645 
GEN ADM 1,600 0,457 3,503 0,001 * 
FINANCE 0,532 0,259 2,049 0,041 ** 
HR -0,987 0,775 -1375 0302 
LAW PUB REL -0,035 0,765 -0,046 0,964 
MARKETING 1,400 0,251 5,571 0,000 ♦ 
SUBCON FRACT 0,341 0,182 1,874 0,061 *** 
FEMEDUFOR*MANAGER 0,124 0,487 0,255 0,799 
MALEDUNA T*MANAGER 
-1,818 0,813 -2336 0,025 
MAI .EDUFOR*MAN AGER -1,373 0,720 -1,908 0,056 *** 
C -2,441 0,399 -6,1 17 0,000 * 
McFadden R-squarcd 0,1237 Mean dependent var 0,1441 
S.D. dependent var 0,3512 S.E. of regression 0,3326 
Akaike info criterion 0,7493 Sum squared resid 220,520 
Schwarz criterion 0,8243 Log likelihood -729,762 
tlannan-Quinn criter. 0,7768 Restr. log likelihood -832,775 
LR statistic 206,0245 Avg. log likelihood -0,3613 
Prob(LR statistic) 0,0000 
Obs with Dep=<) 1.729 Total obs 2.020 
Obs with Dep=l 291 
Notes: Dependent variable is CALL. Logit model has been estimated by maximum 
likelihood, using the econometrics software Eviews. Method: ML-Binary Logit (Quadratic 
hill climbing), with QML (Huber/White test) standard errors and covariance. Due to the 
dummy variables trap, omitted variables are OTHERS, INTERIOR, MORE501, CLERK, 
PRODUCTION, LOGIST1CS, ADMINISTRATIVE, FEMEDUNAT*MANAGER. 
*p<0.01; ♦♦p<0.05; *»*p< 0.1. 
Additionally, women with FM D present a higher estimated probability of eallbacks 
than men do (see Table 14). The coefficient is statistically signifícant at 5% signiftcance 
levei. 
The analysis for REPLY (see Annexes Vil and VIII) model shows no signifícant 
coefficients. Therefore, these results do not support Hypotheses 4a and 4b, suggesting 
that glass-ceiling effect, at this stage of labor market pre-entrance, does not take place. 
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Table 14: Estimation of the model of CALEBACKS - Hiring and glass-ceiling 
(H4b) 
V ariable CoefCieient Std. Error z-Statistie Prob. 
CONSUMER_GOODS -0^66 0,559 -0,477 0,633 
COMMERCE -1354 0,420 -3326 0,001 ♦ 
D1STRIBUTION 0,822 0399 2,057 0,040 ** 
ELECTRONICS -0,547 0326 -1,676 0,094 *** 
PI IARMACEUTICS -0,998 0,620 -1,610 0,107 
SERVICES 0,615 0348 2,480 0,013 ** 
[■"IN ANCESER VICES 0,999 0,351 2,843 0,005 * 
TELECOMUNICATIONS 0327 0,543 0,419 0,675 
LISBON -0,575 0365 -2,168 0,030 
OPORTO -0,692 0325 -2,126 0,034 ** 
SOUTH SEASIDE -1,464 0,658 -2324 0,026 * * 
LITORAL 0332 0341 0,681 0,496 
TYPE 0,125 0312 0,588 0,557 
BETOU) -0308 0,673 -0310 0,757 
BET H 50 -0,344 0354 -1,354 0,176 
BET_51 250 -0,055 0382 -0,196 0,844 
BET 251 500 -0,184 0,401 -0,457 0,647 
MANAGER -0351 0,583 -0,430 0,667 
TECHNICIAN -0,495 0,144 -3,438 0,001 * 
GENADM 1,883 0,603 3,125 0,002 * 
FINANCE 0,734 0359 2,838 0,005 * 
HR -0,700 0,773 -0,905 0,365 
LAWPUBREL -0,085 0,768 -0,111 0,911 
MARKETING 1,411 0352 5,607 0,000 ♦ 
SUBCONTRACT 0,365 0,184 1,982 0,048 ** 
FEMEDUN AT* MANAGER -0312 0,581 -0,536 0,592 
MALEDUN A r*MAN AGER -1,948 0,852 -2386 0,022 
MALEDUFOR*MANAGER -1,503 0,751 -2,000 0,046 
C -2326 0,412 -5,404 0,000 ♦ 
McFadden R-squared 0,13(X) Mean dependent var 0,1441 
S.D. dependent var 0,3512 S.E. of regression 03312 
Akaike infb eriterion 0,7461 Sum squared resid 218,364 
Sehwarz eriterion 0,8266 Log likelihood -724,525 
I lannan-Quinn eriter. 0.7756 Restr. log likelihood -832,775 
LR statislie 216,4988 Avg. kig likelihood -03587 
Prob(LR statistie) 0,0000 
Obs with Dep=0 1.729 Total obs 2.020 
Obs with Dep=l 291 
Notes; Dependent variable is CALL. Logit model has been estimated by maximum 
likelihood, using the econometrics software Eviews, Method: ML-Binary Logit (Quadratic 
hill climbing), with QML (Huber/White test) standard errors and covariance. Due to the 
dummy variables trap, omitted variables are OTHERS, INTERIOR, MORE501, CLERK, 
PRODUCTION, LOGISTICS, ADMIN1STR ATIVE, FEMEDUFOR*MANAGER. 
♦p<0.01; **p<0.05; ***p<0.l. 
Subsequently, we analyze if the location of companies that place job advertisements 
can have a different impacl on the applicants in the estimated probability of contact or 
in the estimated probability of eallbacks for an interview. We estimated several Logit 
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models. The dependent variables are still the REPLY and CALLBACK. We only 
present one CALLBACK model (see Table 15), but we also comment on other 
CALLBACKS and REPLY models, see Annexes IX, X and XI). 
Table 15: Estimation of the model of CALLBACKS - Hiring and company region 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistie Prob. 
CONSUMER_GOODS 0,018 0,556 0.032 0.975 
COMMERCE -1,287 0.417 -3,083 0,002 * 
DISTRIBUTION 1.049 0.396 2.649 0.008 * 
ELECTRONICS -0,445 0,332 -1.337 0.181 
PHARMACEUTICS -0.806 0.628 -1,282 0.200 
SERVICES 0,632 0.245 2.580 0.010 * 
FINANCESER VICES 1.045 0.349 2,997 0.003 * 
TELECOMUNICATIONS 0,302 0,534 0,565 0,572 
TYPE 0,171 0,210 0.818 0.413 O
 1
 
o
 1
 
LL)
 
22
 
0,240 0.630 0.381 0,703 
BET 1150 -0,324 0,252 -1.285 0.199 
BET_51_250 -0,062 0,279 -0,221 0,825 
BET_251_500 -0,326 0.417 -0,783 0.434 
MANAGER -0,845 0.450 -1.879 0.060 ** 
TECHNICIAN -0.480 0.143 -3,367 0.001 * 
GENADM 1.661 0,544 3,054 0,002 ♦ 
FINANCE 0,702 0,260 2,705 0.007 * 
UR -0.757 0,771 -0.981 0.327 
LAW PUB REL -0,058 0,758 -0,076 0,939 
MARKETING 1,436 0.247 5.805 0.000 * 
SUBCONTRACT 0.298 0,180 1,655 0,098 
FEMEDUFOR*LISBON 0,437 0,162 2,688 0,007 * 
FEMEDUFOR*OPORTO 0.265 0,379 0.701 0.483 
FEMED U FO R ♦ SO U THSEAS1D E 0,649 0,777 0,835 0.404 
FEMEDU FOR* LITORAL 0,630 0,477 1,322 0,186 
C -2.909 0,327 -8.890 0,000 * 
MeFadden R-squared 0,1182 Mean dependent var 0.1441 
S.D. dependent var 0,3512 S.E. of regressbn 0.3327 
Akaike intb eriterbn 0,7528 Sum squared resid 220,663 
Sehwarz eriterbn 0.8251 Log likelihood -734.377 
Hannan-Quinn eriter. 0.7794 Restr. log likelihood -832.775 
LR statistic 196.7947 Avg. log likelihood 
-0.3636 
ProbtLR statistie) 0,0000 
Obs with Dep=() 1.729 Total obs 2.020 
Obs with Dep=l 291 
Notes: Dependent variable is CALL. Logit model has been estimated by maximum likelihood, using 
the econometrics software Hviews. Method; ML-Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing), with QML 
(Huber/White test) standard errors and covariance. Due to the dummy variables trap, omitted 
variables are OTHERS, MORE501, CLERK, PRODUCTION, LOG1STICS, ADMINISTRATIVE, 
FEMEDUF0R*INTER10R. ♦pO.Ol; **p<0.05; ■,'**p<0.l. 
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The explanatory variables include company/workplace characteristics and group 
determinants, as well as the interaction effect between regions and applicants (twenty 
interaction variables: tive regions x four applicants). Our findings show that the Litoral 
(Coastal) region presents the highest estimated probability in replying to women with 
FMD (coefficient is statistically significant at 10% significance levei, see Annex IX) 
than the interior regions, and in replies to women with PMD (see Annex X) there are no 
signitlcant differences. Conceming callbacks, women with FMD in the Lisbon region 
appear to have the highest estimated probability (coefficient is statistically significant at 
1% significance levei) than in the Interior regions (see Table 15), and women with PMD 
in the Litoral region present a higher estimated probability than the South-Seaside 
region (coefficient is statistically significant at 10% significance levei, see Annex XI). 
Thus, we cannot confirm hypothesis five, stating that there would be no differences 
between genders in the hiring and recruitment process in ali the regions of the country. 
There is evidence that small companies have higher discrimination representation 
than larger companies (Carlsson and Rooth, 2006). 
Our results (see Table 16 for CALL model) show that micro companies - with 
fewer than 10 employees - present a higher estimated probability of replies and 
callbacks than other company sizes, (ali coeffícients are statistically significant at 1% 
significance levei). Bearing in mind the discrimination in company size, the coefficient 
weight of the different interaction variables suggests different insights. It is as 
easy/difficult for women with PMD to have a reply as it is for men (see Annex XII), but 
women with FMD have a lower estimated probability (in ali cases, coeffícients are 
statistically signitlcant at 1% significance levei). With rcference lo callbacks (see Table 
16) both women, with PMD and FMD, present a lower estimated probability than men 
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do (in ali cases, coefficients are statistically signifícant at 1 % significance levei). Thus, 
as small companies present a higher estimated probability in contacting men with FMD 
than women with FMD and offering an interview to men with PMD and FMD than 
women, our hypotheses 6a and 6b cannot be rejected. 
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Table 16: Estimation of the model of CALLBACKS - Hiring and company size 
Variable CoelTicicnt Std. Error z-Statislic Prob. 
CON SU MER_GOODS -0,556 0,552 -1,007 0,314 
COMMERCE -1,564 0,408 -3,838 0,000 * 
DISTRIBUTION 0,630 0389 1,621 0,105 
ELECTRONICS -0,800 0303 -2,641 0,008 * 
PHARMACEUT1CS -1,280 0,620 -2,065 0,039 ** 
SERVICES 0,428 0316 1,982 0,047 ** 
FINANCE_SERVICES 0,752 0,333 2256 0,024 ** 
TELECOMUNICATIONS 0,055 0,536 0,102 0,919 
LISBON -0,726 0250 -2,898 0,004 * 
OPORTO -0,860 0,307 -2,801 0,005 * 
SOUTH SEASIDE -1,567 0,623 -2,513 0,012 *♦ 
LITORAL 0,065 0342 0,190 0,849 
TYPE -0,050 0201 -0250 0,802 
MANAGER -1,001 0,494 -2,029 0,043 ** 
TECHNICIAN -0,564 0,143 -3,947 0,000 ♦ 
GEN_ADM 1,766 0,578 3,058 0,002 * 
FINANCE 0,666 0243 2,740 0,006 * 
UR -0,762 0,767 -0,993 0,321 
LAW PUB REL -0,172 0,761 -0226 0,821 
MARKETING 1,314 0235 5,599 0,000 * 
SUBCONTRACT 0,363 0,186 1,953 0,051 **» 
F Pi M E D U N AT* B ET_ 11_50 -1,875 0,424 
-4,425 0,000 ♦ 
FEMEDUN AT*BET_51 _250 -2,030 0,481 
-4,216 0,(8)0 * 
FEMEDUNAT*BET_251_500 -1,819 0,652 
-2,792 0,005 ♦ 
FEMEDUN AT*MORE_501 -1,455 0394 
-3.692 0.(8)0 * 
FEMEDUFOR*BET_11_50 -1,643 0,429 
-3,830 0,000 * 
FEMEDUFOR*BET_51_250 -1,132 0,461 -2,458 0,014 »» 
FEMEDU FOR*BET 251500 -1,406 0,652 -2,156 0,031 *♦ 
FEMEDU FOR*MORE_501 -1,674 0,395 -4,234 0,000 ♦ 
MALEDUNAT*BET_1150 -2,483 0,464 
-5,350 0,000 * 
MALEDUNAT*BET_51 250 -1,957 0,478 -4,090 0,000 * 
MALEDU N AT* B ET_251 _500 -2,405 0,759 -3,170 0,002 * 
MALEDUNAT*MORE_501 -2,062 0,437 
-4,719 0,000 ♦ 
MALEDUFOR*BET_ 11_50 -2,089 0.423 
-4,933 0,(8)0 ♦ 
MALEDUFOR*BET_51_250 -1,753 0,478 
-3,668 0,(88) ♦ 
MALEDUFOR*BET_251500 -1,819 0,673 
-2,701 0,007 ♦ 
MALEDU FOR*MORE_501 -1,991 0,420 
-4,734 0,000 * 
C -2,766 0,368 
-8,570 0,000 ♦ 
Mcan dependent var 0,1441 S.D. dependent var 0,3512 
S.E. of regression 0,3313 Akaike inlb crherion 0,7525 
Sum squared resid 2176684,0000 Schwarz criterion 0,8553 
Log likelihood -7230653,0(8)0 Hannan-Quinn eriter. 0,7903 
Avg. log likelihood -0,3580 
Obs with Dep=0 1.729 Total obs 2.020 
Obs with Dep=l 291 
Notes: Dependent variable is CALL. Logit model has been estimated by maximum 
likelihood, using the econometrics software Eviews. Method: ML-Binary Logit (Quadratic 
hill climbing), with QML (Huber/White test) standard errors and covariance. Due to the 
dummy variables trap, omitted variables are OTHERS, MORE501, CLERK, 
PRODUCTION, LOGISTICS, ADMINISTRATIVE, FEMEDUNAT*BET 0 10, 
FEMEDUFOR^BET 010, MALEDUFOR*BET 0 10, MALEDUFOR*BET 0 10. 
*p<0.01; **p<0.05; ***p< 0.1. 
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To summarize and to better view the full context of the expected signals of our 
hypotheses and results, Table 17 is as shown: 
Table 17: Summary of expected signals and results 
Hypot 
heses 
In the hiring process, the estimated probability of replies and 
of callbacks to Model Expected Result 
Prob. 
la ... women with PMD vs. men with PMD REPLY 
CALL 
- n.s. 
+ ** 
Ib ... women with FMD vs. men with FMD REPLY 
CALL 
- n.s. 
+ * 
2a ... women with PMD vs. women with FMD REPLY 
CALL 
= n.s. 
n.s. 
2b ... men with PMD vs. men with FMD REPLY 
CALL 
- n.s. 
n.s. 
2c ... women with FMD vs. men with PMD REPLY 
CALL 
- n.s. 
+ * 
3a 
In tèmale dominated occupations,... women with PMD vs. men 
with PMD 
REPLY 
CALL 
+ 
+ 
n.s. 
n.s. 
3b In tèmale dominated occupations,... women with FMD vs. inen 
with FMD 
REPLY + n.s. 
CALL + + ** 
3c In tèmale dominated occupations,... women with PMD vs. women 
with FMD 
REPLY 
CALL 
- - ** 
* 
4a To manager levei ads,... women with PMD vs. men with PMD REPLY 
CALL 
- 
+ 
+ 
*** 
** 
4b To manager levei ads,... women with FMD vs. men with FMD REPLY 
CALL 
- n.s. 
+ ** 
5 In the ditlèrent regbns of the country, gender discrimination gap 
against women is similar 
REPLY = # *♦* 
CALL = # +** 
6a In small firms.... women with PMD vs. men with PMD REPLY 
CALL 
- = * 
* 
6b In small firms. ... women with FMD vs. men with FMD REPLY - - * 
CALL 
- - 
* 
Notes: Summary of ali Hypotheses with expected signals and results by the two dependem 
variables (models); REPLY andCALL. Probability: ♦p<0.01; *»p<0.05; *»»p< 0.1. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
In addition to providing evidence on gender-based differences in economic 
outcomes for a previously unstudied country, this research advances the works in 
several ways. The results of this research indicate no conclusive support for 
discrimination in women during the fírst phase of the hiring process. Our results suggest 
that the estimated probabilities of being invited to an interview are mostly in favor of 
women mainly at callback levei. 
Both the descriptive statistics, as well as the multivariate analyses show no female 
disadvantage in getting an offer. There is some advantage when one focuses on the job 
advertisements with both male and female applicants. Women are at an advantage in 
getting callbacks, with no evidence of a pro-male bias. There is no question that female 
callbacks are actively sought for in many positions. The few other studies of hiring in 
Norway and the U.S. show similar results: little or no female disadvantage in getting 
offers, with the exception of the U.S. symphony orchestra and the restaurant audit study. 
But the U.S. evidence points in the same direction (Petersen et«/., 2005). 
There is a well-documented unexplained employment gap between men and women 
in the Portuguese labor market that may very well be the result of gender 
discrimination. There is evidence in the fact that men in Portugal have a considerably 
higher employment rate than do women. But there is less reason to believe in the 
presence of discrimination in employers' decisions during the fírst phase of hiring 
because there is no relevant difference in current research. 
Some curriculum vitae can send different signals depending on the applicant 
gender. If this happens, controlling application cores do not necessarily lead to a proper 
discrimination measure. Also, we understand that formal recruitment channels, like 
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newspaper (internet) advertisements are only one type of job search channel. While no 
research has been done on the topic in Portugal, research from other countries suggests 
that for many job advertisements, people are hired through social networks. If women 
are less likely to have established job relevant social networks, excluding this form of 
recruitment may underestimate discrimination. 
We conducted a correspondence test, sending more than two thousand applications 
with randomly assigned women and men with PMD and/or FMD. The difference in 
replies is not significant but, in callbacks is quite different and significant. Several 
explanations can account for this result. First, we focus on a specifíc segment of the 
labor market (financial and insurance activities as well as administrative and support 
services). Focusing on the selection process and experimentally holding the human 
capital in a pair of fictitious job applicants constant but varying only in their gender and 
nature of Mastefs degree achievement, our results show significant differences in 
access to occupations. 
We hope that this research will stimulate the heads of companies on the issue of 
segregation/gender discrimination before entering into the labor market and may 
contribute to reflecting on actions that can and must be achieved in promoting equity 
and diversity in their organizational structures. Due to rising unemployment in this 
period of crisis, employers may feel more comfortable in offering women more 
possibilities to enter the labor market than before. We hope this does not mean an 
expectation for worse salaries and lower working conditions. 
In summary, these results suggest that employers recognize higher abilities or what 
higher skills reflect about unobservcd productivity characteristics for female applicants 
but not for male applicants. The results indicate that the main effect on callbacks for 
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women remains favorable and significant for females and negative and insignificant for 
males. 
Although the experiment has providcd clear evidence for the non-existence of 
gender discrimination during the first phase of the hiring process, it has been more 
difficult to explain why this discrimination oceurs in the labor market. Statistical 
discrimination is often put forward as the most rational reason for discriminatory 
behavior. And women do, on average, take larger responsibility for the family than men. 
Relevant educational skills and job commitment are productivity relevant 
characteristics. But men did not get a higher callback rate than women. So the results of 
this study do not contlrm the "rational" explanatory mechanism behind gender 
discrimination. 
In conclusion, the results in this study suggest that male and female applicants do 
not always face the same type of employer based on unobserved characteristics. 
Employers in Portugal appear to have stronger, negative priorities concerning men and 
women's unobservable characteristics or inflexible tastes for discrimination against 
women or men. This implies that individual investment in human capital enhancement 
may not counter unequal treatment in the labor market alone and that other policy 
initiatives may be necessary to guarantee equal opportunity. 
The degree of gender discrimination that we find is best explained in the statement 
that women with FMD present a higher estimated probability to be invited for an 
interview for advertised jobs than men with FMD. 
The extent of discrimination observed in this experiment directly contradicts any 
notions of inequality in terms of access to employment. As a whole, women do not face 
discrimination during the first phase of the hiring process. 
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Practical Implications 
This research contributes to the existing body of literature on discrimination 
economics according to gender. Portuguesa law prohibits discrimination in the areas of 
employment, including hiring. It is clear from this experiment that discrimination on the 
basis of gender is not present in Portugal, and when it exists, it is relatively low. 
Findings suggest little evidence that women face different informal salary offers from 
employers than men. 
Socially, there has been an increased involvement of politicai and civil society in 
various areas but the social construction based on differences in gender, segregation and 
discrimination sources and the unequal social roles has not been completely 
overthrown. The increased participation of women in the labor market is changing 
social reality, contributing to change gender relations. While effective discrimination 
against women may be lessening, the long-term effects of established male networks 
and their impact on job access may, in effect, cause uncertainty in hiring pattems. The 
discussion about diversity is already on various company agendas, and reality reveals 
that inclusion strategies, eventually adopted, are promoting a substantial impact on 
inequity in the labor market. 
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Limitations and suggestions for future research 
This study has some limitations that must be acknowledged. Firstly, as with ali 
experiments of this nature, a limited number of occupations were tested. It is possible 
that a different discrimination profile could be found for recruitment in different 
professions altogether in Portugal, or higher-skilled positions in these professions. 
Discrimination may also have varied had we tested different groups. 
Secondly, although this study focuses on the whole Portuguese labor market testing 
gender discrimination, an experiment with a larger sample size could detect some 
differences which have not been observed in this sample. Conducting field experiments 
in Portugal will always be challenging, given the small size of the labor market. Thirdly, 
although several studies have examined gender discrimination, very little is known 
about economy recession and structural unemployment. The potential problem here is 
that Portugal, as well as almost ali European countries, has been in a recession since 
2008. The unemployment rate has risen from 8% at the end of 2007 to 13% at the end 
2011. Vacancies have decreased dramatically and, particularly in higher-skilled 
occupations, it would take many years to conduct an experiment of this nature in 
Portugal. As previously noted, correspondence tests like the one reported here are 
limited to jobs which require written applications. In addition, future research could 
study gender discrimination in other fields, away from the workforce, like housing and 
credit applications in banks. As the success ot a field experiment in recruitment depends 
on suffícient vacancies, most oí those mentioned above will be more challenging to 
conduct in altered economic circumstances. We hope that this study will stimulate more 
theory building and testing to investigate the hiring process and the role of men and 
women in the labor market. 
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Annex I: Model to test Hypothesis 2b 
Dependent Variable: REPLY 
Method; ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample: 1 2020 
Included observations: 2019 
Convergence achieved after 6 kerations 
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
Variable CoefTicient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
CONSUMER GOODS 0372 0,568 0,655 0,513 
COMMERCE -2,309 0,647 -3,569 0,000 * 
DISTR1BUTION 1,427 0,411 3,474 0,001 * 
ELECTRONICS -0,506 0,405 -1,250 0311 
SERVICES 0,857 0,306 2,800 0,005 * 
F1NANCE SERVICES 1,021 0,423 2,412 0,016 ** 
TELECOMUNICATIONS 1,328 0,508 2,615 0,009 * 
LISBON -0,631 0,308 -2,047 0,041 ** 
OPORTO -0,896 0,377 
-2,375 0,018 ** 
SOUTH SEASIDE -1,980 0,881 
-2,248 0,025 ** 
LITORAL 0330 0,379 0,608 0,543 
TYPE 0390 0,233 1,247 0313 
BET 0 10 0382 0,741 0,380 0,704 
BETl 150 -0322 0,276 -0,805 0,421 
BET51250 0,149 0,353 0,423 0,672 
BET_251_500 -0,885 0,470 
-1,881 0,060 *** 
MANAGER -0,867 0,572 
-1,515 0,130 
TECHNICIAN -0,571 0,170 
-3,355 0,001 * 
GEN ADM_ 2,177 0,673 3,237 0,001 * 
FINANCE 1,019 0,344 2,966 0,003 * 
HR 0,169 0,806 0310 0,834 
MARKETING 1,964 0,325 6,047 0,000 * 
SUBCONTRACT 0,374 0315 1,740 0,082 *** 
FEMEDUFOR 0336 0,217 1,083 0379 
MALEDUFOR 0,151 0,221 0,685 0,493 
FEMEDUNAT -0,105 0,228 
-0,460 0,646 
C -3,400 0,529 
-6,432 0,000 *** 
McFadden R-squared 0,1685 Mean dependent var 0,1050 
S.D. dependent var 0,3066 S.E. of regression 0,2871 
Akaike info crkerion 0,5854 Sum squared resid 164,1405 
Schwarz criterion 0,6605 Log likelihood 
-564.0029 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0,6130 Restr. log likelihood 
-678,2579 
LR statistic 228,5099 Avg. log likelihood 
-0,2793 
Prob(LR statistic) 0,0000 
Obs with Dep=0 
Obs with Dep=l 
1.807 
212 
Total obs 2.019 
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Annex II: Model to test Hypothesis 2c 
Dependent Variable; CALL 
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample; 1 2020 
Included observations: 2020 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations 
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z- ■Statistic Prob. 
CONSUMER GOODS 0,045 0,500 0,090 0,928 
COMMERCE -1,144 0,410 -2,794 0,005 * 
DISTRIBUTION 1,090 0,366 2,974 0,003 * 
ELECTRONICS -0,360 0,326 -1,105 0369 
SERVICES 0,789 0,247 3,195 0,001 * 
FINANCE SERVICES 1,211 0,340 3,565 0,000 * 
TELECOMUNICATIONS 0,609 0,488 1,247 0,212 
LISBON -0,536 0,266 -2,013 0,044 ** 
OPORTO -0,671 0,325 -2,061 0,039 ** 
SOUTH SEASIDE -1,413 0,641 -2303 0,028 ** 
LITORAL 0^44 0,343 0,712 0,476 
TYPE 0,180 0,204 0,882 0378 
BET 010 -0^32 0,668 -0,348 0,728 
BET 1150 -02358 0,251 -1,427 0,154 
BET 51 250 -0,100 0,282 -0,356 0,722 
BET251500 -0,517 0,349 -1,483 0,138 
MANAGER -0,954 0,482 -1,980 0,048 ** 
TECHNIC1AN -0,503 0,145 -3,460 0,001 * 
GEN ADM 1,845 0,569 3,243 0,001 * 
F1NANCE 0,747 0,250 2,989 0,003 * 
MR -0,694 0,771 -0,901 0,368 
MARKETING 1395 0,237 5,882 0,000 * 
SUBCONTRACT 0,333 0,184 1,809 0,070 *** 
FEMEDUNAT -0390 0,180 -1,614 0,107 
MALEDUFOR -0,474 0,183 -2,588 0,010 * 
MALEDUNAT -0,704 0,193 -3,642 0,000 * 
C -2,093 0,414 -5,059 0,000 * 
McFadden R-squared 0,1310 Mean dependent var 0,1441 
S.D. dependent var 0,3512 S.E. of regression 0,3306 
Akaike info criterion 0,7432 Sum squared resid 217.842 
Schwarz criterion 0,8182 Log likelihood -723,657 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0,7707 Restr. log likelihood -832,775 
LR statistic 218,2346 Avg. log likelihood -0,3582 
Prob(LR statistic) 0,0000 
Obs with Dep=0 
Obs with Dep=l 
1.729 
291 
Total obs 2.020 
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Annex III: Model to test Hypothesis 2c 
Dependent Variable: REPLY 
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample: 1 2020 
Included observations: 2019 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations 
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
CONSUMER GOODS 0,372 0,568 0,655 0,513 
COMMERCE -2,309 0,647 -3,569 0,000 * 
DISTRIBUTION 1,427 0,411 3,474 0,001 * 
ELECTRONICS -0,506 0,405 -1,250 0,211 
SERVICES 0,857 0,306 2,800 0,005 * 
FINANCESERVICES 1,021 0,423 2,412 0,016 ** 
TELECOMUN1CATIONS 1,328 0,508 2,615 0,009 * 
LISBON -0,631 0,308 -2,047 0,041 ** 
OPORTO -0,896 0,377 -2,375 0,018 ** 
SOUTH SEASIDE -1,980 0,881 -2,248 0,025 ** 
LITORAL 0,230 0,379 0,608 0,543 
TYPE 0,290 0,233 1,247 0,213 
BETO 10 0^82 0,741 0.380 0,704 
BET 11 50 -0222 0,276 -0,805 0,421 
B ET 51 250 0,149 0,353 0,423 0,672 
BET_251 500 -0,885 0,470 -1,881 0,060 *** 
MANAGER -0,867 0,572 -1,515 0,130 
TECHNICIAN -0,571 0,170 -3,355 0,001 * 
GEN ADM_ 2,177 0,673 3,237 0,001 * 
FINANCE 1,019 0,344 2,966 0,003 * 
HR 0,169 0,806 0,210 0,834 
MARKETING 1,964 0,325 6,047 0,000 * 
SUBCONTRACT 0,374 0,215 1,740 0,082 *** 
FEMEDUNAT -0,340 0,219 -1,551 0,121 
MALEDUFOR -0,084 0,212 -0,397 0,691 
MALEDUNAT -0,236 0,217 -1,083 0,279 
C -3,164 0,527 -6,002 0.000 * 
McFadden R-squared 0,1685 Mean dependent var 0,1050 
S.D. dependent var 0,3066 S.E. of regression 0,2871 
Akaike info criterion 0,5854 Sum squared resid 164,141 
Schwarz criterion 0,6605 Log likelihood -564,003 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0,6130 Restr. log likelihood -678,258 
LR statistic 228,5099 Avg. log likelihood -0,2793 
Prob(LR statistic) 0,0000 
Obs with Dep=0 
Obs with Dep=l 
1.807 
212 
Total obs 2.019 
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Annex IV: Model to test Hypothesis 3a 
Dependent Variable: REPLY 
Method; ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample: 1 2020 
Included observations: 2019 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations 
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z- ■Statistic Prob. 
CONSUMERGOODS 0,384 0,578 0,663 0,507 
COMMERCE -2,306 0,645 -3,575 0,000 * 
DISTR1BUTION 1,439 0,410 3,511 0,000 * 
ELECTRONICS -0,494 0,405 -1,221 0,222 
SERVICES 0.851 0,306 2,782 0,005 * 
FINANCESER VICES 1,030 0,422 2,440 0,015 ** 
TELECOMUNICATIONS 1,343 0,515 2,608 0,009 * 
LISBON -0,615 0,310 -1,985 0,047 ** 
OPORTO -0,882 0,379 -2,325 0,020 ** 
SOUTH SEASIDE -1,992 0,877 
-2210 0,023 ** 
LITORAL 0,247 0,381 0,648 0,517 
TYPE 0,283 0,234 1,207 0221 
BET 0 10 0,250 0,728 0,344 0,731 
BET 11 50 -0,213 0,277 -0,771 0,441 
BET_51_250 0,150 0,352 0,425 0,671 
BET_251_ 500 -0,888 0,473 -1,879 0,060 
MANAGER -0,845 0,580 -1,456 0,145 
TECHNICIAN -0,551 0,171 -3,221 0,001 * 
GEN ADM 2,052 0,732 2,802 0,005 * 
F1NANCE 1,457 0,374 3,893 0,000 * 
HR -0.012 0,866 -0,014 0,989 
MARKETING 2,405 0,357 6,732 0,000 * 
SUBCONTRACT 0,380 0,215 1,767 0,077 **♦ 
FEMEDUFORTEMALE DOM1N 
1,398 0,551 2,536 0,011 ** 
MALEDUNAT*FEMALE_DOMIN 
0,080 0,726 0,111 0,912 
MALEDUFOR*FEMALE DOMIN 
0,331 0,675 0,491 0,623 
C -3,788 0,528 -7,180 0,000 * 
McFadden R-squared 0,1726 Mean dependent var 0.1050 
S.D. dependent var 0,3066 S.E. of regression 0,2869 
Akaike info criterion 0,5827 Sum squared resid 163,954 
Schwarz criterion 0.6577 Log likelihood 
-561,186 
Hannan-Quinn crher. 0,6102 Restr. log likelihood 
-678,258 
LR statistic 234,1436 Avg. log likelihood 
-0,2780 
Prob(LR statistic) 0,0000 
Obs with Dep=0 1.807 Total obs 2.019 
Obs with Dep=l 212 
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Annex V: Model to test Hypothesis 3c 
Dcpendent Variable: CALL 
Methcxl; ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample; 1 2020 
Inctuded observations: 2020 
Convergence achieved arter 6 iterations 
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
Variable Coe tile icnt Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
CONSUMER GOODS -03278 0,555 -0,502 0,616 
COMMERCE -1,354 0,419 -3330 0,001 * 
DISTRIBUTION 0,830 0,400 2,074 0,038 
ELECTRONICS -0,556 0,325 
-1,711 0,087 + * * 
PHARMACEUTICS -0,987 0,620 -1,591 0,112 
SERVICES 0,623 0,248 2,51 1 0,012 ** 
FINANCE_SERVICES 1,003 0,353 2,844 0,005 * 
TELECOMUNICA LIONS 0225 0,539 0,418 0,676 
LISBON -0,592 03264 
-2343 0,025 ** 
OPORTO -0,702 0324 
-2,166 0,030 ** 
SOUTHSEASIDE -1,462 0,661 
-2311 0,027 + * 
LITORAL 03219 0,340 0,645 0,519 
lA-PE 0,129 0311 0,612 0,541 
BETO 10 -0,177 0,687 
-0357 0,797 
BET11_50 -0351 0353 
-1,386 0,166 
BET 51 250 -0,054 0382 
-0,193 0.847 
BET 251 500 -0.194 0,400 
-0,485 0,628 
MANAGER -1,020 0,491 
-2,075 0.038 ** 
TECHNICIAN -0,529 0,145 
-3,651 0,000 * 
GENADM 2,090 0,603 3,464 0,001 * 
FINANCE 0,377 0379 1,353 0,176 
HR -0,525 0,786 
-0,668 0,504 
LAW PUB REL -0,462 0,778 
-0,593 0,553 
MARKETING 1,040 0378 3,740 0,000 ♦ 
SUBCONTRACT 0,369 0,184 2,008 0,045 ** 
FEMEDUNAT*FEMALE_DOMIN 
-0,248 0,419 
-0,593 0,553 
M A LEDUN AT*FEMA LEDOMIN 
-1,175 0,583 
-2,015 0,044 
MALEDUFOR^FEMALE DOMIN 
-1,175 0,561 
-2,093 0,036 ** 
C -1,835 0.427 
-4.294 0,000 * 
McFadden R-squarcd 0,1292 Mean dcpendent var 0,1441 
S.D. dcpendent var 0,3512 S.E. of regression 0,3309 
Akaike info criterion 0,7467 Sum squared reskl 218,013 
Schwarz criterion 0,8273 Log likelihood 
-725,166 
Uannan-Quinn criter. 0,7763 Restr. bg likelihood 
-832,775 
LR statLstic 215,2169 Avg. bg likelihood -0,3590 
ProNLR statLstic) 0,0000 
Obs with l)ep=0 1.729 Total obs 2.020 
Obs with Dep=l 291 
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Annex VI: Model to test Hypothesis 3c 
Dependent Variable; REPLY 
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample: I 2020 
Included observations; 2019 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations 
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
CONSUMER GOODS 0,368 0,570 0,645 0,519 
COMMERCE -2,313 0,645 -3,584 0,000 * 
DISTRIBUTION 1,429 0,406 3,519 0.000 * 
ELECTRONICS -0,514 0,403 -1274 0203 
SERVICES 0,860 0,305 2,816 0,005 * 
FINANCE SERVICES 1,014 0,424 2293 0,017 ** 
TELECOMUNICATIONS 1,319 0,509 2,591 0,010 * 
LISBON -0,644 0208 -2,092 0,037 ** 
OPORTO -0,907 0277 -2,403 0,016 ** 
SOUTH_SEASIDE -1,985 0,884 
-2246 0,025 ** 
LITORAL 0,219 0,378 0,578 0,563 
TYPE 0295 0232 1,270 0204 
BETO 10 0,300 0,735 0,408 0,683 
BET_ 11 50 -0227 0,276 -0,824 0,410 
BET51_250 0,150 0,352 0,424 0,671 
BET 251 500 -0,884 0,467 
-1,892 0,059 *** 
MANAGER -0,884 0,569 
-1,553 0,121 
TECHNICIAN 
-0,583 0,170 
-3,419 0,001 * 
GENADM 2215 0,691 3253 0,001 * 
FINANCE 0,785 0270 2,122 0,034 ** 
HR 0294 0,827 0,356 0,722 
MARKETING 1,724 0,356 4,840 0,000 * 
SUBCONTRACT 0271 0215 1,728 0,084 
FEMEDUNAT*FEMALE DOMIN 
-0295 0,487 
-0,606 0.544 
MALEDUNAT*FEMALE_DOMIN 
-0,761 0,667 
-1,141 0254 
MALEDUFOR*FEMALE DOMIN 
-0,507 0,608 
-0,834 0,404 
C -3,070 0.536 
-5,729 0,000 * 
McFadden R-squared 0,1677 Mean dependent var 0,1050 
S.D. dependent var 0,3066 S.E. of regression 02869 
Akaike info criterion 0,5860 Sum squared res id 163,923 
Schwarz criterion 0,6610 Log likelihood 
-564.520 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.6135 Restr. log likelihood 
-678258 
LR statistic 227,4756 Avg. bg likelihood 
-02796 
Prob(LR statistic) 0,0000 
Obs with Dep=0 
Obs with Dep=l 
1.807 
212 
Total obs 2.019 
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Annex VII: Model to test Hypothesis 4a 
Dependent Variable: REPLY 
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample: 1 2020 
Included observations; 2019 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations 
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
CONSUMER GOODS 0,459 0,568 0.809 0,418 
COMMERCE -2,188 0,646 -3.385 0,001 ♦ 
DISTRIBUTION 1,447 0,403 3,595 0,000 ♦ 
ELECTRONICS -0,440 0,404 -1,090 0,276 
SERVICES 0,917 0,305 3,009 0,003 * 
FINANCESER VICES 1,152 0,415 2,777 0,006 * 
TELECOMUNICATIONS 1,491 0,517 2,882 0,004 * 
LISBON -0,632 0,309 -2,045 0,041 ** 
OPORTO -0,927 0,378 -2,452 0,014 ** 
SOUTH SEASIDE -1,934 0,883 -2,191 0,029 ** 
LITORAL 0,185 0,379 0,487 0,626 
TYPE 0,309 0,231 1,340 0,180 
BETOIO 0,230 0,678 0,340 0,734 
BETl 150 -0,187 0,272 -0,687 0,492 
BET_51_250 0,171 0,344 0,498 0,619 
BET251_500 -0,889 0,478 -1,861 0,063 
GENADM 1,973 0,515 3,831 0,000 + 
FINANCE 0,781 0,345 2,260 0,024 * * 
HR -0,184 0,811 
-0,227 0,821 
MARKETING 1,940 0,328 5,922 0,000 * 
SUBCONTRACT 0,353 0,211 1,674 0,094 *** 
FEMEDUFOR*MANAGER -0,092 0,538 
-0,171 0,865 
MALEDUNAT*MANAGER -1,399 0,815 
-1,717 0,086 * ** 
MALEDUFOR*MANAGER -0,943 0,737 
-1,279 0,201 
C 
-3,566 0,490 
-7,281 0,000 * 
McFadden R-squared 0,1619 Mean dependent var 0,1050 
S.D. dependent var 0,3066 S.E. of regression 0,2879 
Akaike info criterion 0,5879 Sum squared resid 165,221 
Schwarz criteriop 0,6574 Log like|ihood 
-568,473 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0,6134 Restr. log likelihood 
-678,258 
LR statistic 219,5705 Avg. log likelihood 
-0,2816 
Prob(LR statistic) 0,0000 
Obs with Dep=0 
Obs with Dep=l 
1.807 
212 
Total obs 2.019 
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Annex VIII: Model to test Hypothesis 4b 
Dependent Variable: REPLY 
Method; ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample: 1 2020 
Included observations: 2019 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations 
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
CONSUMER GOODS 0376 0,575 0,654 0,513 
COMMERCE 
-2,311 0,645 -3,581 0,000 * 
D1STRIBUTION 1,433 0,404 3,547 0,000 * 
ELECTRONICS -0,506 0,404 -1353 0310 
SERVICES 0,856 0306 2,803 0,005 * 
FINANCESERVICES 1,020 0,423 2,414 0,016 ** 
TELECOMUNICATIONS 1329 0,511 2,603 0,009 * 
L1SBON -0,631 0,306 -2,062 0,039 ** 
OPORTO -0,896 0377 -2379 0,017 ** 
SOUTH SEASIDE -1,988 0,885 -2347 0,025 ** 
LITORAL 0333 0378 0,617 0,537 
TYPE 0,290 0333 1342 0314 
BET 0 10 0377 0,727 0382 0,703 
BETJ150 -0321 0377 
-0,800 0,424 
BET 51 250 0,149 0352 0,424 0,672 
BET 251_500 -0,885 0,468 -1,892 0,059 *** 
MANAGER -0,432 0,657 -0,658 0,510 
TECHNIC1AN -0,570 0,170 
-3,356 0,001 * 
GEN ADM 2,180 0,682 3,195 0,001 * 
FINANCE 1,018 0,344 2,956 0,003 * 
HR 0,166 0,806 0306 0,837 
MARKETING 1,961 0,326 6,011 0,000 * 
SUBCONTRACT 0374 0314 1,746 0,081 *** 
FEMEDUNAT^MANAGER 0,000 0,615 0,000 1,000 
MALEDUNAT*MANAGER -1310 0,859 
-1,524 0,128 
MALEDUFOR*MANAGER -0,853 0,767 
-1,111 0367 
C -3322 0,506 
-6,561 0,000 * 
McFadden R-squared 0,1692 Mean dependent var 0,1050 
S.D. dependent var 0,3066 S.E. ofregression 03866 
Akaike info criterion 0,5849 Sum squared resid 163,645 
Schwarz criterion 0,6600 Log likelihood 
-563,505 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0,6125 Restr. log likelihood 
-678358 
LR statistic 229,5059 Avg. bg likelihood 
-03791 
Prob(LR statistic) 0,0000 
Obs with Dep=0 
Obs with Dep=l 
1.807 
212 
Total obs 2.019 
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Annex IX: Modei to test Hypothesis 5 (1) 
Dependent Variable; REPLY 
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample; 1 2020 
Included observations: 2019 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations 
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
CONSUMERGOODS 0,578 0,554 1,044 0,297 
COMMERCE -2,266 0,653 -3,468 0,001 * 
D1STRIBUTION 1,619 0,395 4,096 0,000 ♦ 
ELECTRONICS -0,451 0,412 -1,094 0,274 
SERVICES 0,841 0,296 2,838 0,005 ♦ 
F1NANCE SERVICES 1,027 0,410 2,501 0,012 ** 
TELECOMUNICATIONS 1,345 0,507 2,656 0,008 * 
TYPE 0,325 0,232 1,400 0,162 
BET 0 J0 0,632 0,666 0,949 0,343 
BETl 150 -0,237 0,279 
-0,850 0,395 
BET_51_250 0,122 0,347 0,352 0,725 
BET_25I 500 -0,996 0,470 -2,121 0,034 ** 
MANAGER -0,715 0,528 -1,353 0,176 
TECHNICIAN -0,548 0,167 -3,276 0,001 ♦ 
GENADM 1,916 0,629 3,048 0,002 * 
FINANCE 0,948 0,338 2,803 0,005 * 
HR 0,104 0,801 0,130 0,897 
MARKETING 1,952 0,317 6,166 0,000 * 
SUBCONTRACT 0,299 0,210 1,421 0,155 
FEMEDUFOR*LISBON 0,098 0,198 0,494 0,621 
FEMEDUFOR^OPORTO 0,236 0,449 0,526 0,599 
FEMEDUFOR*SOUTH SEASIDE 
-0,540 1,279 
-0,422 0,673 
FEMEDUFOR*LITORAL 0,820 0,493 1,661 0,097 *** 
C 
-3,901 0,434 
-8,993 0,000 * 
McFadden R-squared 0,1533 Mean dependent var 0,1050 
S.D. dependent var 0,3066 S.E. of regression 0,2889 
Akaike info criterion 0,5926 Sum squared resid 166,528 
Schwarz criterion 0,6593 Log likelihood 
-574,265 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0,6171 Restr. log likelihood 
-678,258 
LR statistic 207,9866 Avg. log likelihood 
-0,2844 
Prob(LR statistic) 0,0000 
Obs with Dep=0 1.807 Total obs 2.019 
Obs with Dep=l 212 
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Annex X: Model to test Hypothesis 5 (2) 
Dependent Variable; REPl.Y 
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Date: 09/19/11 Time: 17:38 
Sample; 1 2020 
Included observaiions: 2019 
Convergence achieved alter 6 iterations 
QML (Huber/White) standard crrors & covariance 
Variable Coenicicnt Std. Error z- ■Statistic Prob. 
CONSUMER GOODS 0,638 0,551 1,159 0,247 
COMMERCE -22266 0,651 -3,482 0,001 ♦ 
DISTRIBUTION 1,589 0,398 3,995 0,000 * 
ELECTRONICS -0,452 0,412 -1,098 0372 
SERVICES 0,842 0397 2,835 0,005 * 
FINANCESER VICES 1.026 0,410 2,503 0.012 ** 
TELECOMUNICATIONS 1342 0,506 2,651 0,008 ** 
TYPE 0326 0330 1,419 0,156 
BET 010 0,678 0,668 1,015 0310 
BET H 50 -02222 0378 -0,800 0,424 
BET_51250 0,133 0344 0386 0,699 
BET_251_500 -0,981 0,472 -2,079 0,038 ** 
MANAGER -0,703 0,527 -1,335 0,182 
TECHNICIAN -0,539 0,168 -3312 0,001 ♦ 
GENADM 1,924 0,627 3,067 0,002 * 
FINANCE 0,970 0339 2,864 0,004 * 
11R 0,118 0,800 0,147 0,883 
MARKETING 1,982 0317 6363 0,000 ♦ 
SUBCONTRACT 02273 0310 1397 0,195 
FEMEDUNA r*EISBON -0,190 0312 -0,900 0,368 
FEMEDUNAr*0 PORTO -0,878 0,588 -1,492 0,136 
FEMEDUNAT^INTERIOR 0,155 0,584 0,266 0,790 
FEMEDlJNAT*LITORAL 0,284 0,471 0,603 0,547 
C -3,851 0,438 -8,798 0,000 * 
McFadden R-squared 0,1535 Mean dependent var 0,1050 
S.D. dependent var 0,3066 S.E. of regression 03890 
Akaike info criterion 0,5925 Sum squared resid 166,631 
Schwarz. criterion 0,6592 Log likelihood 
-574,170 
1 lannan-Quinn criter. 0.6170 Restr. log likelihood 
-678358 
ER statistic 208,1759 Avg. log likelihood 
-0,2844 
Prob(LR statistic) 0,0000 
Obs with Dep=0 1.807 Total obs 2.019 
Obs with Dep=l 212 
68 
ANA MARGARIDA DUARTE Tl IE IMPACT OF GENDER ON THE FIRST PH ASE OF HIR1NG PROCESS: 
FIELD EXPER1MENTS IN PORTUGAL 
69 
Annex XI: Model to test Hypothesis 5 (3) 
Depcndent Variable: CALL 
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample: 1 2020 
Included observations: 2020 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations 
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
Variable CoefUcient Std. Error z -Statistic Prob. 
CONSUMERGOODS -0,059 0,556 -0,107 0,915 
COMMERCE -1,295 0,416 -3,111 0,002 * 
DISTRIBUTION 1,011 0,393 2,570 0,010 ** 
ELECTRONICS -0,465 0,328 -1,419 0,156 
PHARMACEUT1CS -0,849 0,621 -1,366 0,172 
SERVICES 0,626 0,242 2,589 0,010 ♦ 
F1NANCE_SER VICES 1,030 0,345 2,982 0,003 ♦ 
TELECOMUNICATIONS 0,290 0,541 0,536 0,592 
TYPE 0,156 0,211 0,740 0,459 
BETOIO 0,151 0,629 0,240 0,810 
BETl 150 -0332 0,253 -1,311 0,190 
BET_51250 -0,064 0,279 
-0,228 0,820 
BET_25I_500 -0300 0,414 
-0,725 0,469 
MANAGER -0,866 0,458 -1,890 0,059 
TECHNICIAN -0,483 0,142 -3,405 0,001 ♦ 
GEN ADM 1,669 0,544 3,065 0.002 ♦ 
FINANCE 0,702 0,260 2,704 0,007 * 
UR -0,745 0,770 
-0,968 0,333 
LAWPUBREL -0,056 0,770 
-0,072 0,942 
MARKETING 1,420 0,250 5,687 0,000 * 
SUBCONTRACT 0310 0,181 1,712 0,087 *** 
FEMEDUNAT*LISBON 0,039 0,174 0,223 0,824 
FEMEDUN A r*OPORTO 0,192 0,411 0,467 0,641 
FEMEDUNAT* INTERIOR 0,174 0,525 0,332 0,740 
FEMEDUN AT*LlTORAL 0,751 0,417 1,804 0,071 *** 
C -2,794 0,324 
-8,629 0,000 * 
McFadden R-squared 0,1146 Mean dependent var 0,1441 
S.D. dependent var 03512 S.E. of regression 0,3332 
Akaike iníb criterion 0,7558 Sum squared resid 221,384 
Schwarz criterion 0,8280 Log likelihood 
-737,323 
1 lannan-Quinn criter. 0,7823 Restr. log likelihood 
-832,775 
LR statlstic 190,9039 Avg. log likelihood 
-03650 
Prob(LR statistic) 0,0000 
Obs with Dep=() 1.729 Total obs 2.020 
()bs with Dep=l 291 
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Annex XIII: e.g. Application letters 
Ex.mo(s) Senhor(s), 
Face à recente oferta de emprego apresentada pela v/ organização, estou a enviar-vos a 
minha informação pessoal e profissional para análise. 
Embora a minha actual ocupação profissional apresente um carácter essencialmente 
técnico, o meu perfil pessoal demonstra capacidades para a área comercial e de gestão. 
A facilidade de relacionamento e a ambição em atingir todos os objectivos que me são 
propostos, são algumas das minhas principais características. 
Embora actualmente resida na Nazaré (local onde trabalho), sou natural da zona sul do 
país onde mantenho habitação (familiar). Tenho disponibilidade para fixar residência 
em qualquer ponto do país. 
Fico a aguardar o v/ contacto para uma eventual entrevista, onde poderei explicitar as 
motivações com que me candidatei à v/ oferta. 
Com os meus melhores cumprimentos. 
R. M. 
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Annex XII1V: e.g. Curricula Vitae 
DADOS PESSOAIS 
Nome 
Morada 
Renato Filipe Marques 
R. Grupo Desportivo "Os Nazarenos" Lt 2 30Esq 
2450-266 Nazaré 
Telefone 927144807 
Correio electrónico marquesrenato@iol.pt 
Nacionalidade Portuguesa 
Data de nascimento 09/11/1985 
FORMAÇÃO ACADÉMICA 
2008: 
Master em Business Administration ministrado pela School of Business 6C Finance - 
Licenciatura em Finanças da Universidade de Aveiro - Média final de 14 valores. 
Principais Cadeiras: Contabilidade; Finanças Empresarias; Analise Financeira; 
Empreendedorismo. 
London 
2005: 
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EXPERIÊNCIA PROFISSIONAL 
Desde 2009: 
Colaboração com empresa local dedicada à Prestação de serviços de contabilidade 
e acessória financeira a empresas: 
Recepção, organização e classificação de documentos; 
Lançamento informático dos diversos movimentos contabilísticos; 
Verificações, rectificações e encerramento de contas; 
Processamento de salários. 
De 2003 a 2005: 
Delegado Comercial na empresa Paramédica - Equipamentos Médicos, Lda: 
Gestão de uma carteira de clientes, prospecção de novos clientes, divulgação e 
demonstração de produtos. 
OUTRAS INFORMAÇÕES 
Domínio língua Inglesa; 
Conhecimentos satisfatórios de Fqpççs ç Espanhol; 
Bons conhecimentos de informática; 
Inscrição na OTOC; 
Viatura própria. 
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